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L Introduction
The EPA's administrative compliance orders (ACOs) are important
enforcement tools used to enforce the Clean Air Act (CAA) and other
environmental statutes.' It is clear why these informal agency actions have
become the EPA's most commonly used enforcement device.2 ACOs may be
issued with relatively little administrative process and do not require the EPA to
1. See 2 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION § 9:9
(Sheldon M. Novick et al. eds., 2004) [hereinafter LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION]
(discussing the benefits of using ACOs for less serious violations that the DOJ or the
Administrator would be hesitant to spend their time on).
2. See U.S. ENVIRONmENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, FISCAL YEAR 2001 ENFORCEMENT
AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE ACCOMPLISHMENTS REPORT, at 64-70 (2002) [hereinafter 2001
EPA ACCOMPLISHMENTS REPORT] (providing statistics that show the EPA's use of compliance
orders and other enforcement mechanisms from 1999-2001 across a number of environmental
statutes), available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/reports/accomplishments/
oeca/fy0laccomplishment.pdf.
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go to court.3 An ACO serves to provide a regulated entity with notice that the
EPA regards it as in violation of statutory or regulatory requirements, and it
often requires the party to take or refrain from taking a particular action in order
to comply with the applicable law.4 If the regulated party does not comply, the
EPA may pursue judicial enforcement or administratively assess penalties.5
Because disobeying an ACO is itself a separate violation of law over and above
noncompliance with a particular provision of the Act, ACOs provide the
agency with a powerful enforcement mechanism that requires a relatively
modest expenditure of scarce agency resources. 6 Moreover, until recently, the
EPA could issue ACOs without triggering a right to pre-enforcement judicial
review because courts had not viewed the orders as "final agency action."7 This
gave the EPA added leverage to press regulated parties into compliance with
the terms of the ACO, while retaining the discretion whether and when to seek
enforcement.8
From the regulated entity's perspective, however, being on the receiving
end of an ACO can present a painful "Hobson's choice."9 The entity may
disregard the order and risk accrual of civil and criminal penalties for either the
underlying violation of the law or for violating the terms of an ACO.'0 On the
3. See LAW OF ENvIRoNmENTAL PROTECTION, supra note 1, § 9:9 (describing ACOs as
quick, responsive and flexible enforcement tools).
4. See Daniel F. O'Sullivan, Note, The Clean AirActAmendments of1990: Permits and
Enforcement-The Guts of the New Law, 18 U. DAYTON L. REv. 275, 304-05 (1992)
(discussing the mechanics of the compliance order enforcement scheme).
5. See Clean Air Act § 113(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b) (2000) (providing the EPA with the
authority to seek enforcement of an order in a federal district court or administratively assess
penalties of up to $27,500 per day per violation of the CAA, or both); see also Joseph M.
Santarella, Jr., Enforcement and Liability, in ENvIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK 57, 69 n. 18
(Thomas F.P. Sullivan ed., 17th ed. 2003) (explaining that although the environmental statutes
specifically authorize penalties of up to $25,000 per day, the Debt Collection Improvement Act
of 1996 mandated that the EPA raise its civil penalties by 10 percent pursuant to the EPA's
Civil Monetary Inflation Adjustment Rule found at 61 Fed. Reg. 69360 (Dec. 31, 1996) and
codified at 40 C.F.R. Parts 19 and 27).
6. See Clean Air Act § 113(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(3) (2000) (providing civil or
criminal liability for violating any rule, plan, order, waiver or permit issued under the CAA).
7. See infra Parts III & IV (discussing the availability of pre-enforcement review of
ACOs including the recent trend toward allowing review under certain circumstances).
8. See generally Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 837-38 (1985) (discussing the
presumption that executive agency enforcement decisions are completely discretionary).
9. See MORRIS DICTIONARY OF WORD AND PHRASE ORIGIN 289-90 (Harper & Row 2d ed.
1988) (describing a Hobson's choice as an apparent choice that is really no choice at all because
both options are equally undesirable); SPECTATOR, No. 509 (Oct. 14, 1712) (describing the
Cambridge stable manager, Tobias Hobson, who rented his horses and obliged customers to take
either the horse nearest the stable door or none at all).
10. See Clean Air Act § 113(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b) (2000) (providing the EPA with the
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other hand, a party can comply with the ACO, often at enormous cost, and
potentially forfeit the right to obtain judicial review of the factual or legal
accuracy of the EPA's position.
In 2003, the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Tennessee Valley Authority v.
Whitman'2 (TVA I) held unconstitutional the EPA's use of an administrative
compliance order in the context of the Clean Air Act enforcement scheme.
1 3
The court held that the ACO scheme violated both the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment 14 and separation of powers principles.'5 In the court's
view, because failure to comply with the terms of an order can trigger severe
civil or criminal penalties without giving the defendant an opportunity for
meaningful judicial review, the ACO enforcement scheme could not withstand
constitutional scrutiny.16 As a result, the court reasoned that ACOs could not
be given legal effect, and thus their validity is not subject to review in the
federal courts of appeals. 17
authority to seek judicial or administrative penalties for noncompliance with the CAA or for
noncompliance with an ACO).
11. See, e.g., Allsteel, Inc. v. EPA, 25 F.3d 312, 316 (6th Cir. 1994) (Wellford, J.,
concurring) (noting the harsh consequences that can result from the EPA issuing an order and
then sitting back knowing that courts ordinarily deny pre-enforcement review of ACOs). This
scenario can play out anytime courts deny pre-enforcement review of an ACO, thereby leaving
the regulated party to either obey the order or risk severe penalties in the event that the EPA
initiates an enforcement action. If the agency never seeks enforcement in court, the regulated
party could conceivably have complied with an invalid order without ever having had a day in
court to challenge the merits of the order.
12. See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Whitman, 336 F.3d 1236, 1258-59 (1 1th Cir. 2003), cert
denied, Leavitt v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 124 S. Ct. 2096 (2004) (concluding that ACOs are legally
inconsequential and do not constitute final agency action because of their inherent constitutional
flaws). Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Whitman, 278 F.3d 1184 (11th Cir. 2002) (TVA 1) was a
preliminary decision by the Eleventh Circuit holding that the court had jurisdiction to hear a
dispute between two executive branch agencies and that the EPA's Environmental Appeals
Board decision constituted final agency action for purposes ofjudicial review under the Clean
Air Act. Id. at 1199-1206.
13. See TVA II, 336 F.3d at 1258-59 (discussing the court's due process concerns).
14. See id. at 1258-60 (discussing the court's due process concerns with the ACO
enforcement scheme under the CAA); U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 4 (stating "nor [shall any
person] be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law").
15. See TVA II, 336 F.3d at 1259 (discussing the constitutional violations that the CAA
enforcement scheme presents).
16. See id. at 1258 (determining that the statutory scheme denies the regulated party
review on questions of whether the conduct underlying the issuance of the order actually took
place and whether that conduct amounts to a violation of the CAA). See generally
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000) (describing the scope of federal judicial
review of administrative action).
17. See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Whitman, 336 F.3d 1236, 1260 (11th Cir. 2003)
(concluding that the federal courts of appeals lack subject matter jurisdiction to review the
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The Eleventh Circuit's decision is important because it casts a shadow
over one of the EPA's most important and effective tools for enforcing the
CAA against stationary sources of air pollution.'8 Currently, the Eleventh
Circuit is the only jurisdiction in which the EPA is no longer issuing ACOs.' 9
Indeed, the TVA II decision implicates the constitutionality of environmental
laws in general to the extent that these statutes allow for government
enforcement by means of compliance orders.20 The EPA uses ACOs to enforce
a number of other environmental statutes that may be negatively impacted by
the decision, including the Clean Water Act (CWA)2' and the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).
22
Despite their efficiency and efficacy for the EPA, the use of ACOs raises
procedural due process concerns because it may allow the EPA to deprive a
regulated party of property without offering a meaningful opportunity to be
heard on the issue of whether a party violated the order or the CAA.23 These
concerns turn on whether judicial review is available prior to an EPA-initiated
validity of ACOs).
18. See Stephen L. Kass & Jean M. McCarroll, Constitutional Status of the Clean Air
Act's Compliance Orders, N.Y.L. J., June 25, 2004, at 3 (discussing the importance of ACOs in
the CAA enforcement); see also Clean Air Act § I II(a)(3), U.S.C. § 7411(a)(3) (2000)
(defining a stationary source as "any building, structure, facility, or installation which emits or
may emit any air pollutant").
19. See Robert R.M. Verchick, Toward Normative Rules for Agency Interpretation:
Defining Jurisdiction Under the Clean WaterAct, 55 ALA. L. REv. 845, 860 (2004) (noting the
agency's deference to the Eleventh Circuit ruling in TVA/L) (citing Interview with David Cozad,
Environmental Protection Agency, Region VII, Kansas City, Missouri (Nov. 10, 2003)).
20. See Petition for Certiorari at 18, Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Whitman, 336 F.3d 1236 (1 th
Cir. 2003), 2004 WL 304351 (Feb. 13, 2004) (No. 03-1162) [hereinafter EPA Petition for
Certiorari] (discussing potential negative consequences of the Eleventh Circuit's decision);
Brief for Petitioner at i, Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Whitman, 82 Fed. Appx. 220, 2003 U.S. App.
LEXIS 27278 (11 th Cir. 2003) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner] (discussing the significance of
the issues involved in TVA I/).
21. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a) (2000) (authorizing compliance orders that must state with
reasonable specificity the nature of the violation and provide a specific time frame for
compliance).
22. See 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a) (2000) (providing for orders that can assess a civil penalty
for past or present violations of the act and require compliance immediately or within a
specified time period).
23. See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Whitman, 336 F.3d 1236, 1241 (11 th Cir. 2003) ("The
problem with ACOs stems from their injunction-like legal status coupled with the fact that they
are issued without an adjudication or meaningful judicial review."); E.P. Krauss, Unchecked
Powers: The Supreme Court and Administrative Law, 75 MARQ. L. REv. 797, 820 (1992)
(describing procedural due process as requiring that persons affected by special burdens of
agency action in consequence of past facts be afforded a meaningful opportunity to participate
in the decisionmaking process).
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judicial enforcement action.24 Pre-enforcement review, in a federal court,
would give regulated parties the opportunity to defend themselves on the merits
of the conduct underlying the EPA's order and challenge the validity of the
ACO before substantial financial harm could accrue.25 Most courts, however,
have denied pre-enforcement review of ACOs, resulting in a circuit split on this
issue.26
The majority of courts hold that pre-enforcement review is unavailable for
ACOs based primarily on two theories.27  First, courts have found pre-
enforcement review contrary to the congressional intent expressed in the
legislative history of the CAA.28 Second, courts have held that ACOs do not
constitute final agency action and thus are not subject to review under the
federal court's subject matter jurisdiction limitations. 9
24. See TVA II, 336 F.3d at 1241 (discussing the court's concerns with the ACO
enforcement scheme).
25. This harm could take the form of noncompliance penalties that could accrue under
Section 113(d) of the CAA after the EPA initiates an enforcement action, or it could be the harm
caused by an order halting construction on a new or existing plant. See, e.g., Alaska Dep't of
Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 244 F.3d 748, 750 (9th Cir. 2001) (suggesting that considerable
costs in both time and money may accrue from a halt construction order on defendant's facility).
26. See, e.g., Southern Pines Assocs., ex rel. Goldmeier v. United States, 912 F.2d 713,
715 (4th Cir. 1990) (concluding that an ACO that ordered the developer to cease and desist
discharge of all fill materials into wetlands under the Clean Water Act was not reviewable prior
to an EPA enforcement action); Solar Turbines, Inc. v. Seif, 879 F.2d 1073, 1082 (3d Cir. 1989)
(concluding that a stop work order issued pursuant to Section 167 of the CAA did not constitute
final agency action). But see Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 244 F.3d 748, 751
(9th Cir. 2001) (permitting review of a Section 113(a)(5) halt construction order on a power
generator); Allsteel, Inc. v. EPA, 25 F.3d 312, 315 (6th Cir. 1994) (permitting review of a
Section 1 13(a)(5)(A) stop construction order on Allsteel's Tennessee manufacturing facility).
27. See Asbestec Constr. Servs., Inc. v. EPA, 849 F.2d 765, 770 (2d Cir. 1988)
(determining that an ACO requiring Asbestec to comply with proper methods for removing
asbestos was not final agency action for purposes ofjudicial review); Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co.
v. EPA, 554 F.2d 885, 891 (8th Cir. 1977) (denying pre-enforcement judicial review of an EPA
order requiring conformity with a visible air pollution provision of a State Implementation Plan
(SIP)). In addition, the Third, Fourth, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have all denied
pre-enforcement review of ACOs either under the CAA or CWA. See infra Part 111.D
(discussing judicial treatment of ACOs).
28. See, e.g., Solar Turbines, Inc. v. Seif, 879 F.2d 1073,1077 (3d Cir. 1989) (discussing
the judicial review provisions laid out by Congress in Section 307 of the CAA); Asbestec
Constr. Servs., Inc. v. EPA, 849 F.2d 765, 767-68 (2d Cir. 1988) (concluding that the
legislative history of the 1977 Amendments supported the EPA's position that pre-enforcement
review of compliance orders issued under Section 7412(c) was unavailable); Hoffman Group,
Inc. v. EPA, 902 F.2d 567, 569 (7th Cir. 1990) (concluding that pre-enforcement review of a
Clean Water Act ACO was impliedly precluded by the statutory structure, which empowers the
EPA to enjoin violations of the Act only through enforcement proceedings).
29. See, e.g., Acker v. EPA, 290 F.3d 892,894 (7th Cir. 2002) (determining that the ACO
was not final agency action because it merely alerted the defendant to the potential for legal
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In contrast, other courts have ruled that ACOs are reviewable under certain
circumstances.3 ° The Sixth and Ninth Circuits have held that ACOs may
constitute final agency action if the impact of the order on the regulated party is
practical and immediate .3  This approach has also found that the CAA did not
manifest convincing evidence of a legislative intent to preclude pre-enforcement
judicial review.32
TVA II did not fall neatly into either category. The Eleventh Circuit's
decision was novel because, although courts have raised the possibility that the
ACO enforcement scheme may present due process concerns, no court has
previously addressed those constitutional concerns in depth.33 Following the
Eleventh Circuit's decision, the United States Supreme Court denied the EPA's
petition for certiorari.34 Thus, the question remains open as to whether the use of
ACOs violates the due process rights of regulated parties.35
This Note aims to provide a practical approach for the treatment of ACOs
that mitigates the constitutional concerns raised by the EPA's enforcement
scheme.36 Part II of this Note will briefly describe the inherent enforcement
difficulties faced by the EPA and how those problems gave rise to the ACO.37
consequences if he failed to comply with the provisions of the CAA); Solar Turbines, 879 F.2d
at 1079-80 (discussing the standards used to determine whether agency action is final).
30. See Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 244 F.3d 748, 750 (9th Cir. 2001)
(concluding that the court had jurisdiction to review the EPA's stop-construction order on one
of Cominco's power generators); Allsteel, Inc. v. EPA, 25 F.3d 312, 314 (6th Cir. 1994)
(reviewing an EPA stop-work order on a facility in Tennessee).
31. See Alaska Dep't ofEnvtl. Conservation, 244 F.3d at 750 (noting that the EPA's order
created an immediate and significant impact on Cominco's operations); Allsteel, 25 F.3d at 314-
15 (assessing factors that contribute to the finality of agency action).
32. See id. at 314 (concluding that judicial review of CAA administrative orders was not
barred by Congress).
33. See Southern Pines Assocs., ex rel. Goldmeier v. United States, 912 F.2d 713, 717
(4th Cir. 1990) (rejecting appellants claims that an ACO violated their due process rights
because they were not subject to an injunction or penalty until the EPA initiated an enforcement
proceeding); Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. EPA, 415 F. Supp. 799, 807 (W.D. Mo. 1976), affd,
554 F.2d 885 (8th Cir. 1977) (determining that due process was afforded by the EPA's
enforcement scheme because the defendant could seek review in the Court of Appeals within
thirty days of final agency action or by asserting claims as a defense in an EPA enforcement
action).
34. See Leavitt v. TVA, 541 U.S. 1030, 1030 (2004) (denying the petition for certiorari
by a unanimous vote).
35. See Kass & McCarroll, supra note 18, at 3 (discussing potential implications of the
TVA II decision).
36. See infra Part V.B (suggesting that courts use an undue burden test to help determine
finality of agency action).
37. See infra Part II (discussing the institutional obstacles faced by the EPA in attempting
to carry out its enforcement duties).
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Next, this Note will discuss the purposes of the ACO3 8 and the uses to which the
EPA has put the orders in administrative practice.39 Part Ill will examine the
division of authority on judicial review of ACOs by the federal courts.4° Part IV
will discuss the Eleventh Circuit's due process holding in TVA 11.41 Part V will
explain why the Eleventh Circuit's decision should not be followed4 2 and suggest
an approach that courts may take in reviewing ACOs that mitigates the
constitutional concerns raised by the ACO enforcement scheme.43
. Purpose of the ACO Enforcement Scheme Under the Clean Air Act
A. Overview of the Enforcement Problems Inherent in Environmental Law
To understand the significance of the TVA If decision, it is important to
recognize the inherent tension underlying environmental laws that makes their
enactment and enforcement very difficult. 44 This tension derives from the
radically redistributive effects of these laws.45 Environmental laws impose
substantial costs on regulated parties, often far removed spatially and temporally
from those who would enjoy the benefits of those laws.4 6 Because of the
difficulties associated with analyzing cause and effect over vast spatial and
temporal dimensions, it is problematic to ascertain scientifically the benefits of
environmental regulation with any degree of certainty.47 The more immediate and
38. See infra Part II.B (discussing the goals that Congress designed ACOs to effectuate).
39. See infra Part II.C (describing the mechanics of the ACO enforcement scheme).
40. See infra Part III (discussing the general theories upon which judicial review of
administrative action rests).
41. See infra Part IV (outlining the rationale taken by the Eleventh Circuit in holding the
ACO enforcement scheme unconstitutional).
42. See infra Part V.A, B (discussing an alternate interpretation of the ACO enforcement
provisions in the CAA).
43. See infra Part V.C (suggesting an approach that can avoid constitutional concerns and
get the courts and the agency on the same page).
44. See generally Richard J. Lazarus, Judging Environmental Law, 18 TUL. ENVTL. L.J.
201,206-08 (2004) (discussing the difficulties inherent in environmental lawmaking that arise
from the mismatch between features of the natural environment and the features of the U.S.
lawmaking process).
45. See Richard J. Lazarus, A Different Kind of"Republican Moment" in Environmental
Law, 87 MINN. L. RaV. 999, 1000 (2003) (discussing the barriers to enacting environmental
protection laws).
46. See id. (describing the source of the obstacles to enactment of environmental laws as
the spatial and temporal distribution of the costs and benefits of those laws).
47. See id. (discussing the problems associated with ecological cause and effect in
ascertaining benefits of environmental laws).
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concrete economic impact on regulated entities, however, is relatively simple to
calculate and certain in its effects.48 Thus, potent political forces, in the "here and
now," often mobilize to oppose enactment and enforcement of laws that "will
benefit those elsewhere or in the future.
4 9
Furthermore, enactment of environmental laws does not ensure enforcement
or compliance. 50 The primary problem with agency enforcement is a lack of
resources. 51 For example, environmental laws often require states to assume
enforcement responsibility subject to federal supervision.5 2 State enforcement,
however, is often lax and inconsistent with statutory requirements.53 In such
cases, the EPA may withdraw approval from a state enforcement program and
assume federal control; however, this rarely happens because of the EPA's
limited resources,5 4 the ever-expanding number of regulated entities,55 and the
48. See id. (contrasting the relative ease of predicting economic impact in the here and
now with environmental benefit in the future).
49. Id; see also The Honorable Henry A. Waxman, An Overview of the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990,21 ENvTL. L. 1721, 1723 (1991) (discussing the thirteen-year battle over
clean air legislation that culminated in the 1990 Amendments); Casey Bukro, Congress'
Antipollution Talk is All Hot Air Again, CI. TRIB., Oct. 30, 1988, at C4 (discussing the
difficulties Congress faced in attempting to amend the CAA).
50. See Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative
Compliance in Environmental Law, 23 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 297,297 (1999) ("In all areas of
law, there are gaps between the 'law on the books' and the 'law in action,' but in environmental
law the gap is sometimes a chasm.").
51. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EPA AND THE STATES: ENvIRONMENTAL
CHALLENGES REQUIRE A BETTER WORKING RELATIONSHiP, GAO/RCED-95-65, at 3 (Apr. 1995)
(discussing the burdens faced by the states and the EPA in implementing environmental
legislation).
52. See Farber, supra note 50, at 303-04 (discussing the problems created by
noncompliance of state regulators).
53. See id at 303 (noting the enforcement difficulties associated with relying on often
noncompliant state regulators).
54. See id. (discussing reasons for the EPA's lax oversight of state environmental
regulators).
55. See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE
ASSURANCE FISCAL YEAR 1998 ACCOMPLISHMENTS REPORT, at 10 (June 1999) [hereinafter 1998
EPA ACCOMPLISHMENTS REPORT] (noting that as of 1999 the EPA listed 39,961 facilities that
were regulated under the stationary source provisions of the CAA), available at
http://www.epa.gov/complianceresources/reprts/accomphshments/oeca/fy98accomphshment.pdf.
Compare this number of facilities with the EPA's Office of Compliance and Enforcement staff,
consisting of a total of 1464 full-time employees to enforce and monitor facilities across all
environmental statutes. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFCE, INFORMATION ON THE
ENvIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY'S ACTUAL AND PROPOSED FUNDING FOR ENFORCEMENT
ACTIVITIES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2001 THROUGH 2002, GAO-02-1096R at 2 (Sept. 27, 2002),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02l096r.pdf.
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enormous strain that disapproval may create in federal-state relations.56
Environmental laws can amount to little if they are not enforced or if the
consequences of noncompliance lack bite.57 At his confirmation hearing in
1989, EPA Administrator William K. Reilly echoed this sentiment when he
told senators that "aggressive enforcement ... is the key to an effective EPA
and to a clean environment. " 58 Soon thereafter, Reilly ushered in an era of
broad expansion in the breadth of the EPA's enforcement authority.59 In
response to calls for more rigorous enforcement of the CAA, Congress
delegated several powerful enforcement tools to the EPA. 60  These
enforcement tools enabled the agency to compel compliance more effectively,
assess penalties, and deter violation of the agency's regulations.6' One of
these tools was the current form of the ACO.62 Coupled with the expanded
administrative authority to impose monetary penalties,63 the ACO gave the
agency the flexibility and efficiency needed to pursue a larger number of minor
polluters. 64
56. See, e.g., John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54
MD. L. REv. 1183, 1216-24 (1995) (discussing the interdependence of state and federal
agencies necessary to enforce the CAA).
57. See MARc K. LANDY ET AL., THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY: ASKING THE
WRONG QuESTIONs 204 (1990) (noting that regulations only reveal their true meaning through
enforcement); Howard Latin, Regulatory Failure, Administrative Incentives, and the New Clean
Air Act, 21 ENvTL. L. 1647, 1707-09 (1991) (discussing failures in the administrative
enforcement of environmental laws).
58. Nomination of William K. Reilly: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Environment
and Public Works, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1989).
59. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399(1990)
(revising the Act to include, inter alia, more efficient civil and criminal enforcement devices for
the EPA); see also Waxman, supra note 49, at 1809-11 (summarizing the enhanced
enforcement features of the revised Act).
60. See Clean Air Act § 113,42 U.S.C. § 7413 (2000) (providing the federal enforcement
devices granted to the EPA under the CAA).
61. Id.
62. See Clean Air Act § 113(a)(1)(A), (a)(2)(A), (a)(3)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(1)(A),
(a)(2)(A), (a)(3)(B) (2000) (providing the EPA with authority to issue orders compelling
compliance with various provisions of the CAA); Clean Air Act § 167,42 U.S.C. § 7477 (2000)
(authorizing orders and pursuit of injunctive relief as necessary to compel compliance with other
sections of the CAA).
63. See Clean Air Act § 113(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d) (2000) (providing for
administratively assessed penalties of up to $27,500 per day, totaling up to $200,000).
64. See LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, supra note 1, § 9:9 (discussing the benefits
of using ACOs for less serious violations that the DOJ or the Administrator would be hesitant to
spend their time on); see also infra notes 90-97 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose
and use of the administrative penalty order).
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B. Defining an ACO
The ACO is an enforceable legal order that may require the recipient to
take some corrective or remedial action within a given time, refrain from certain
behavior, or require future compliance with a statute or regulation. 65 Although
ACOs are not self-enforcing,66 a party that refuses to obey an ACO is
potentially subject to severe civil or criminal liability for the underlying
violation of the statute or regulation if the order is enforced in court.67
Violation of the ACO itself may also be a basis for civil or criminal penalties
over and above any sanctions for the underlying violation of law.68 ACOs are
designed to be quick, responsive, and flexible enforcement tools that are often
used, for example, to halt construction or modification of a facility,69 or to force
compliance with permit requirements
70 or state implementation plans.
71
65. See U.S. ENviRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTALENFORCEMENT: A
CmZEN's GUIDE (Mar. 1990), at http://www.epa.gov/Region4/air/enforce/citizenf.htm (last
visited Feb. 1, 2005) [hereinafter CrrIzEN's GUIDE] (describing the mechanics of the EPA's
administrative enforcement scheme) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
66. See Clean Air Act § 113(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b) (2000) (providing that the EPA is
required to initiate a civil judicial action in a federal district court to enforce its orders); Student
Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Fritzche, Dodge & Olcott, Inc., 759 F.2d 1131,
1138 (3d Cir. 1985) (ruling that ACOs issued under Section 1319 of the CWA are not self-
executing but rather a separate enforcement action must be filed and litigated in district court).
67. See Clean Air Act § 113(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(1) (2000) (providing for criminal
liability including fines, imprisonment, or both); Clean Air Act § 113(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)
(2000) (allowing the EPA to assess civil penalties, based on the violation of an administrative
order, of up to $27,500 per day, not to exceed to a total of $200,000).
68. See Clean Air Act § 113(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b)(2) (2000) (authorizing the EPA to
seek judicial assessment of penalties of up to $27,500 per day per violation of the CAA); Clean
Air Act § 11 3(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(1) (2000) (providing for criminal liability for violation
of any rule or order issued under specific titles of the CAA).
69. See LAW OF ENViRONMENTAL PROTECTnON, supra note 1, § 9:9 (discussing the purpose
of administrative compliance orders); see, e.g., Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA,
244 F.3d 748, 749 (9th Cir. 2001) (discussing the EPA's order requiring Cominco to stop
construction or modification at its Red Dog Mine Facility); Allsteel, Inc. v. EPA, 25 F.3d 312,
313 (6th Cir. 1994) (describing a stop construction order on a manufacturing facility thought to
be in violation of the CAA).
70. See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Whitman, 336 F.3d 1236, 1244 (lth Cir. 2003)
(describing an order requiring the TVA to apply for permits to comply with the CAA's New
Source Review permit program).
71. See Clean Air Act § 113(a)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(2)(A) (2000) (providing the
EPA with authority to issue ACOs for violations of SIPs and permit programs under Title V);
Robert A. Wyman, Jr. et al., Meeting Ambient Air Standards: Development of the State
Implementation Plans, in THE CLEAN Am ACT HANDBOOK 41,41-69 (Robert J. Martineau, Jr. &
David P. Novello eds., 2d ed. 2004) (explaining that state implementation plans are plans
prepared and submitted by the states to the EPA and used to enforce the EPA's established
National Ambient Air Quality Standards for each of the EPA's listed criteria pollutants).
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ACOs are vital enforcement tools because of the EPA's limited resources. 72
To effectively police environmental laws, the EPA needs streamlined, flexible,
and efficient enforcement tools that avoid the necessity of constant litigation and
are particularly well suited to minor violations.73 The ACO serves this purpose by
putting an alleged violator on notice that more severe action may be taken if the
party fails to comply and by encouraging rapid settlements. 74
In order to understand the purpose of the ACO in its current incarnation, it
will be useful to summarize the evolution of the CAA enforcement scheme. The
CAA has undergone three major overhauls in its thirty-five year history with the
most recent and comprehensive revisions coming in 1990. 75 These Amendments
to the CAA were designed in part to aid the EPA's ability to administer its
regulations by broadening the scope of the agency's enforcement power.76
1. The Clean Air Act Prior to the 1990 Amendments
The pre-1990 Act lacked the flexibility and breadth of enforcement tools
necessary to punish and deter polluters quickly and efficiently.77 As a result, most
72. See David R. Hodas, Enforcement of Environmental Law in a Triangular Federal
System: Can Three Not Be a Crowd When Enforcement Authority Is Shared by the United
States, the States, and Their Citizens?, 54 MD. L. REv. 1552, 1571 (1995) (noting that, because
the major environmental laws are federal, the quantity, variety, and geographic dispersion of
regulated parties is so great that enforcement would be impossible if left solely to the federal
government).
73. See LAW OF ENViRoNMENTALPROTECION, supra note 1, § 9:9 (discussing the purpose
of the compliance orders).
74. See O'Sullivan, supra note 4, at 305 (discussing the utility of ACOs).
75. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990); see
Michael R. Barr, Introduction to the Clean AirAct: History, Perspective, andDirection for the
Future, in THE CLEAN AIR ACT HANDBOOK 1, 2 (Robert J. Martineau, Jr. & David P. Novello
eds., 2d ed. 2004) (noting that the major overhauls of the CAA were the amendments of 1970,
1977, and 1990). The 1970 Amendments established a major federal regulatory role in air
regulation for the first time. Id. at 5. The 1977 Amendments doubled the size of the CAA, and
the 1990 Amendments doubled it again including exponential growth of the EPA's regulations.
Id. at 2.
76. See THE NEW CLEAN AIR ACT: COMPLIANCE AND OPPORTuNrrY 286-87 (Reiner Lock
& Dennis P. Harkawik eds., 1991) (discussing the additional targeted violations covered in the
1990 Amendments); see also Julie R. Domike & Alec C. Zacaroli, Civil Enforcement, in THE
CLEAN AIR ACT HANDBOOK 567 (Robert J. Martineau, Jr. & David P. Novello eds., 2d. ed.
2004) (describing the enhanced enforcement scheme as including an operating permit program,
broad penalty and compliance order authority, and full investigatory and emergency remedial
powers).
77. See James Miskiewicz & John S. Rudd, Civil and Criminal Enforcement of the Clean
Air Act After the 1990 Amendments, 9 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 281, 310 (1992) (discussing the
statutory flaws that hampered enforcement of the pre-1990 CAA).
1890
FACING A HOBSON'S CHOICE
of the EPA's significant enforcement actions were referred to the Department of
Justice (DOJ) for prosecution in the civil judicial forum.78 Litigation brought
enormous costs and increased involvement by agency management that drained
the EPA's enforcement resources and limited enforcement action to only the
most high profile cases. 79 Resources were stretched so thin that the DOJ
became reluctant to pursue "procedural violations" of the Act.80 The DOJ
argued that "unless the violations were connected with exceedances of
emissions standards, where the public health was arguably threatened, judges
would be unsympathetic. ' ,8 ' This situation proved particularly difficult for the
agency as testing, monitoring, recordkeeping, and reporting were crucial to the
EPA's ability to carry out its mission of protecting human health and the
environment.
8 2
Prior to 1990, the utility of the ACO was limited because noncompliance
could only be addressed through litigation. 3 Also, regulated parties had to
comply within an unrealistically short thirty-day period that severely limited use
of the orders.84 The ACO lacked bite because the agency had no independent
authority to assess penalties, except for a cumbersome, resource-intensive, and
inflexible noncompliance penalty order.85 As a result, the noncompliance order
was seldom pursued and failed to provide the economic disincentive for which
78. See id. (discussing the practical problems created by the agency's narrow enforcement
authority).
79. See id. (discussing the problems associated with the agency's focus on civil judicial
enforcement).
80. See id. (noting the DOJ's reluctance and describing procedural violations as including
requirements of testing and monitoring of equipment, reporting, and recordkeeping).
81. Id.
82. Id.; see also RICHARD J. LAZARUS, MAKING OF ENvioNmENTAL LAW 69 (noting that
the EPA was created as a noncabinet agency with the exclusive function of protecting the
environment). This arrangement was born out of a concern that vesting stewardship over the
environment within several broader cabinet level agencies with competing governmental
policies favoring resource exploitation would not yield positive results. Id.
83. See COMPLIANCE AND OPPORTUNITY, supra note 76, at 288 (comparing the EPA's pre
and post- 1990 enforcement authority).
84. See ARNOLD W. REITZE, JR., AIR POLLUTION CONTROL LAW: COMPLIANCE &
ENFORCEMENT 527 (2001) (discussing the effect of the 1990 Amendments on enforcement of the
CAA).
85. See Miskiewicz & Rudd, supra note 77, at 308 (discussing the difficulties associated
with use of the noncompliance penalty order). The noncompliance penalty order was designed
to penalize a polluter according to the economic value the source gained through
noncompliance. The formula was so complex that the EPA needed to hire a contractor to
compute the penalty. See Clean Air Act § 120(c), 42 U.S.C. § 7420(c) (1988) (authorizing the
state or federal enforcing agency to contract with a third party to assist in determining the
penalty assessment).
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it was designed.86 Thus, the EPA's power was limited to threatening a
noncompliant party with expensive and time-consuming litigation that the
agency often lacked the resources to pursue.87
2. The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990
The 1990 Amendments set out to remedy many of these enforcement
limitations by adding a wider range of response options, including field
citations, permit programs, and enhanced criminal prosecution. 88  They
alleviated the problem of thirty-day compliance schedules by extending the
period up to one year, making the orders a more valuable and flexible
enforcement tool.89 The Amendments also enhanced the deterrent effect of the
Act through the possibility of civil and criminal liability,90 and enabled the
agency to assess "administrative civil penalties" for noncompliance of up to
$27,500 per day.91 After receiving an administrative penalty, an alleged
offender has thirty days to file a request for a hearing on the record that meets
the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).92 The
Administrator has the flexibility to compromise, modify, or remit these
86. See Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., A Century ofAir Pollution Control Law: What's Worked;
What's Failed; What Might Work, 21 ENVTL. L. 1549 n.383 (1991) (noting that during the first
ten years of the Section 120 noncompliance penalty order, the EPA concluded only 38
noncompliance cases and only 24 of these cases resulted in the imposition of a penalty of which
the highest penalty was $45,528 and the average was only $13,526) (citing U.S.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, REPORT ON EPA's FEDERAL PENALTY PRACTnCES FY 86-
87 (1988)).
87. See COMPILANCE AND OPPORTUNITY, supra note 76, at 288 (discussing the impact of
the EPA's enhanced compliance order authority after the 1990 Amendments).
88. See REITZE, supra note 84, at 525 (discussing the use of compliance orders pre-1990
and after the 1990 Amendments); see also Clean Air Act § 113(d)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(3)
(2000) (providing for a field citation program that is geared toward minor violations and is
basically the equivalent of an EPA traffic ticket).
89. See REITZE, supra note 84, at 525 (discussing the effect of the 1990 Amendments on
enforcement of the CAA).
90. See Clean Air Act § 113(b)(c)(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b)(c)(d) (2000) (providing the
EPA and the DOJ with the authority to seek judicial enforcement or civil or criminal penalties).
91.- See Clean Air Act § 113(d)(l), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(1) (2000) (providing a limit on
penalty orders of $200,000, except when the Administrator and Attorney General jointly
determine that a larger administrative penalty is appropriate).
92. See Clean Air Act § 113(d)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(2)(A) (providing an
opportunity for a hearing on the record in accordance with the APA); Administrative Procedure
Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556 (2000) (providing administrative agencies with a minimum level of
procedures required for an adjudication or hearing on the record).
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penalties with or without conditions.93 The advent of the administrative penalty
order elevated the ACOs potency because the agency could threaten a regulated
party with substantial penalties without going to court.9 4 The administrative
civil penalty should not be confused with the civil judicial penalties available
through an enforcement action in district court under CAA Section 11 3(b).
95
Unlike the administrative penalty, the judicial penalty has no cap and results in
substantially larger monetary recovery for the agency.96 Furthermore, judicial
penalties are assessed under a strict liability theory and thus do not require a
"knowing" violation of the CAA.9 7
C. Uses of the ACO
An ACO may simply be seen as putting the polluter on notice that further
action may be taken if compliance is not achieved quickly. 98 The ACO
provides the EPA with discretion on how to ensure compliance because the
ACO satisfies the thirty-day notice requirement necessary for other enforcement
actions to be taken.99 The agency may choose to rely on the ACO alone, or it
93. See Clean Air Act § 113(d)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(2)(B) (2000) (providing that
"[tihe Administrator may compromise, modify, or remit, with or without conditions, any
administrative penalty which may be imposed under this subsection").
94. See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Whitman, 336 F.3d 1236, 1258 (11th Cir. 2003) (noting
that ACOs can lead directly to the imposition of severe civil and criminal penalties).
95. See Clean Air Act § 113(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b) (2000) (providing the EPA with
authority to commence a civil action for violation of an order and seek injunctive relief or to
assess a civil penalty not to exceed $27,500 per day for each violation).
96. See, e.g., U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Environmental Results Through
Smart Enforcement: Fiscal Year 2002 Enforcement and Compliance Assurance
Accomplishments Report, at 59 (May 2003) [hereinafter 2002 EPA Accomplishments Report]
(comparing the dollar value of EPA enforcement actions under various environmental statutes
and charting fiscal year 2002 penalty assessments), available at http://www.epa.gov/
compliance/resources/reports/accomplishments/oeca/fy02accomplishment.pdf (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). For example, the EPA assessed $5.9 million in
administrative penalties under the CAA and $33.8 million in judicial penalties in 2002. Id.
97. See RErrZE, supra note 84, at 546 (discussing the scope of the Section 113(b) civil
penalty liability).
98. See O'Sullivan, supra note 4, at 305 (discussing the EPA's enforcement options after
the 1990 Amendments); see also Acker v. EPA, 290 F.3d 892, 894 (7th Cir. 2002) ("All the
order does is alert Acker to the potential for legal consequences if he fails to comply with his
existing duties and obligations under the CAA.").
99. See Clean Air Act § 113(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b) (providing for thirty day notice
requirement that the party has violated or is in violation of some requirement or prohibition of
the CAA).
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may pursue other avenues of enforcement.10 0 The ACO, however, is faster, less
costly, and thus more beneficial to the EPA in its efforts to protect the
environment. 0 1 The offender may respond quickly to avoid more serious
enforcement consequences, thereby allowing ACOs to make the best use of
limited agency enforcement resources.
0 2
Several conditions apply to the issuance of ACOs.10 3 First, the ACO must
be based on any information available to the Administrator.' 4 Second, the
ACO must be issued within 30 days after the issuance of a Notice of
Violation. 10 5  This notice alerts state regulators and alleged violators of
impending federal enforcement and gives them the opportunity to comply and
avoid enforcement altogether. 10 6 Third, the regulated party must be given an
opportunity to confer with the EPA Administrator. 0 7 This conference gives the
alleged violator a chance to present a legal argument and to offer evidence
100. See Clean Air Act § 113(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(3) (2000) (providing the EPA
with several enforcement options); see also 2002 EPA Accomplishments Report, supra note 96,
at 59-67 (providing data that shows the EPA's use of its various enforcement mechanisms over
the last five years).
101. See O'Sullivan, supra note 4, at 305 (noting how the efficiency of the ACO scheme
may benefit the agency and the public through rapid compliance).
102. Id.
103. See Clean Air Act § 113(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a) (2000) (providing the specific
criteria necessary for issuing an ACO).
104. Clean Air Act § 1 13(a)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(l)(A) (2000).
105. See Clean Air Act § 113(a)(l), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(1) (2000) (stating that "the
Administrator shall notify the person and the State in which the plan applies"); see also
COMPLIANCE AND OPPORTUNITY, supra note 76, at 287 (noting that if the state is systematically
failing in the enforcement of its SIP, the EPA may assume enforcement authority in that state
from the time of public notice of the state's ineffectiveness until the state resumes authority over
enforcement, thus alleviating the need for the EPA to give the normal 30 day notice of
violation).
106. See LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, supra note 1, § 9:6 (discussing the purpose
and use of the Notice of Violation). The Notice of Violation pertains to violations of state-
developed requirements and not federally developed programs such as New Source Performance
standards, hazardous emissions, federal inspection and information gathering requirements, or
the automobile emissions requirements. Id.
107. See Clean Air Act § I1 3(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(4) (2000) (providing that an ACO
does not become effective until after the violator has had the opportunity to confer with the
EPA, except for those cases involving hazardous air pollutants); see also Steven Herman,
Guidance on Implementation of the EPA's Penalty/Compliance Order Authority Against
Federal Agencies Under the Clean Air Act, at 10 (Oct. 9, 1998) (explaining that parties should
have the opportunity to confer with an EPA official who has the authority to issue ACOs and
the conference with the EPA should be requested in less than the thirty day period required to
seek a conference for penalty orders), available at http://www.epa.gov/Compliance/resources/
policies/civil/federal/caagui98.pdf.
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informally to persuade the EPA to withdraw or modify the order without resort
to the judicial process.1 °8
Because the ACO is the most expeditious and cost-effective method of
resolving disputes with regulated parties, the EPA has relied heavily on ACOs
in most of the enforcement programs that authorize them.'0 9 Since 1983, the
EPA has issued 1500 to 3000 compliance orders per year across all the
environmental statutes. °10 The widespread use of ACOs contrasts with the
EPA's civil referrals to the DOJ, which increased from around 120 referrals per
year in the early 1980s to peak at just over 400 per year by the late 1990s."l
To understand the mechanics of a typical ACO, consider the following
hypothetical.1 12  The EPA Administrator receives an anonymous tip that
"Asbestos World," a company engaged in an asbestos removal project, is not
complying with the removal procedures set forth in the CAA. 113  The
Administrator then issues a notice of violation containing the EPA's belief that
108. See Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. EPA, 554 F.2d 885, 891 (8th Cir. 1977) (noting that
the conference procedure is an important means of abating violations without resorting to the
judicial process); Domike & Zacaroli, supra note 76, at 576 (discussing the EPA's normal
procedures in scheduling the conference with an alleged violator); see also LAW OF
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, supra note 1, § 9:10 (suggesting that failure to bring issues to the
EPA's attention at this informal stage may preclude subsequent judicial review on a theory of
failure to exhaust administrative remedies).
109. See CITIZEN's GUIDE, supra note 65, at 1 (explaining the advantages of administrative
enforcement response efforts); 2001 EPA ACCOMPLISHMENTS REPORT, supra note 2, at 64-73
(providing statistics that show the EPA's use of compliance orders from 1999-2001 across a
number of environmental statutes). During the three-year period, the EPA issued as many as
298 compliance orders under the CAA and as few as 192. Id. at 68. Under the Clean Water
Act, compliance orders are used even more frequently; as many as 596 orders were issued in
2000 and as few as 374 were given in 2001. Id.
110. See id. at 68 (depicting compliance orders issued under each environmental program
from 1999-2001); 1998 EPA ACCOMPLISHMENTS REPORT, supra note 55, at 90 (charting
compliance order usage from 1996-98); U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, SUMMARY
OF ENFORCEMENT ACCOMPLISHMENTS FISCAL YEAR 1987, at V (Apr. 1988) (charting compliance
orders issued from 1980-87), available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/reports/
accomplishments/oeca/fy87accomp-rpt.pdf.
111. See 1998 EPA ACCOMPLISHMENTS REPORT, supra note 55, at 94 (charting total civil
referrals from the EPA to the DOJ from 1975-98). The EPA has not provided data regarding
civil referrals to the DOJ in its two most recent accomplishments reports from 2001 and 2002.
2002 EPA ACCOMPLISHMENTS REPORT, supra note 96; 2001 EPA ACCOMPLISHMENTS REPORT,
supra note 2.
112. This example is based loosely on Asbestec Constr. Servs., Inc. v. EPA, 849 F.2d 765
(2d Cir. 1988).
113. See Clean Air Act § 113(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a) (2000) (providing that the
compliance order authority may apply "on the basis of any information available to the
Administrator"). This provision gives the agency extremely broad authority to issue orders even
based on circumstantial evidence.
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the company is violating a specific provision of the CAA's asbestos removal
procedures. After thirty-days, the EPA finds the party has violated or is in
violation of the Act and orders it both to identify all removal projects during the
previous two years and to comply fully with the CAA in its future projects.
The EPA then offers the company an opportunity to request an informal
conference with the Administrator within ten days of the order. 1,4 Asbestos
World decides that, according to its understanding of the regulations, it is
already complying with the CAA and will therefore disregard the ACO.
At this point, the CAA provides the EPA with several choices. First, the
EPA may initiate a civil judicial enforcement action or an action for injunctive
relief in a district court.' 1 5 Second, the agency may request that the Attorney
General bring a criminal action against Asbestos World based on the EPA's
belief that the company is knowingly violating the CAA. 116 Third, the agency
may assess an administrative penalty order of up to $27,500 per day." 7 If the
EPA waits and does not immediately initiate an enforcement proceeding, the
company is at risk of accruing civil penalties for each day of each violation of
the CAA. 1 18 Again, the ACO increases this risk because a regulated party is
subject to liability for both a violation of a particular CAA provision and for
violation of the ACO itself. 1 9 In effect, the EPA is able to use the economic
threats of civil and criminal penalties and prolonged litigation to force a
regulated party into a Hobson's choice. A party will either need to negotiate a
settlement, comply with the Act, accrue penalties, or litigate. This powerful
114. See Clean Air Act § 1 13(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(4) (2000) (providing regulated
parties the opportunity to confer with the Administrator before an order issued under this
subsection may take effect).
115. See Clean Air Act § 113(a)(1)(C), (a)(2)(C), (a)(3)(C), (b), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(1)(C),
(a)(2)(C), (a)(3)(C), (b) (2000) (providing the EPA with the authority to commence a civil
judicial action in the district where the violation occurred, where the violator resides, or where
the violators principle place of business is located).
116. See Clean Air Act § 113(a)(3)(D), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(3)(D) (2000) (authorizing
criminal punishment by a fine pursuant to Title 18, or by imprisonment not to exceed 5 years or
both, and civil penalties up to $25,000 per day for violation of any "order" issued by the EPA).
117. See Clean Air Act § 113(d)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(2)(A) (providing for the
assessment of administrative penalty orders so long as the offender has the opportunity for a
formal hearing on the record); Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 555 (providing
the procedural requirements for agency adjudications and hearings on the record); see also 40
C.F.R. pt. 22 (providing the EPA's "Consolidated Rules of Practice Governing the
Administrative Assessment of Civil Penalties and the Revocation/Termination or Suspension of
Permits"). This Part includes a list of procedures governing formal agency adjudication. Id.
§§ 22.13-26.
118. See Clean Air Act § 113(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b) (2000) (providing for assessment
and recovery of civil penalties when the agency initiates a civil judicial enforcement action).
119. Clean Air Act § 113(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a) (2000).
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incentive to comply can be created at a relatively modest cost to the EPA
because the agency's decision to prosecute or initiate any kind of formal
adjudicatory proceedings is completely discretionary. 20
11. Judicial Review of A COs
Judicial review of administrative action is governed by the APA 121 and by
a body of federal common law that has been described as "a whole congeries of
judicial theories and practices.' 22 This body of law includes the theories of
ripeness, exhaustion, and finality.123 Though separable, these concepts often
overlap in attempting to consider a broad array of concerns on the appropriate
timing for judicial review. 124 Although all three related theories are relevant to
ACOs, courts have focused primarily on finality in determining whether pre-
enforcement review of an order should be available. 125 The focus on finality
stems from the fact that Section 307(b) of the CAA explicitly grants
jurisdiction to review agency action in the court of appeals for "any other final
action taken by the Administrator under this Act.' 26 If courts deem ACOs
120. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821,837-38 (1985) (discussing the presumption that
agency enforcement decisions arc unreviewable under the APA unless Congress specifically
provides otherwise).
121. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2000) (providing that "[a]gency
action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is no other adequate
remedy in a court are subject to judicial review").
122. See Louis L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 329 (1965)
(discussing the development of the common law ofjudicial review).
123. See generally Ticor Title Ins., Co. v. FTC, 814 F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (denying
review in three separate opinions based on three respectively different theories of exhaustion,
finality, and ripeness); Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967) ("Without
undertaking to survey the intricacies of the ripeness doctrine it is fair to say that its basic
rationale is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling
themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect the
agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its
effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties.").
124. See Nat'l Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council v. Schultz, 443 F.2d 689, 692
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (discussing the reviewability of an agency's interpretive action).
125. See Clean Air Act § 307(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (2000) (providing for judicial review
of final agency action in court of appeals for the appropriate circuit). The pre-enforcement
review controversy that this Note contemplates revolves around whether a compliance order is
considered final agency action and thus is subject to pre-enforcement review. See also Tenn.
Valley Auth. v. Whitman, 336 F.3d 1236, 1259 (11th Cir. 2003) (concluding that the ACO
scheme unconstitutionally delegates judicial power by relegating district courts to forums for the
EPA to conduct show-cause hearings).
126. See Clean Air Act § 307(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (2000) (providing for review if a
person files within sixty days of the date that the EPA publishes its order in the Federal
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final agency action, then a regulated party need not face the Hobson's choice of
waiting and wondering whether the EPA will seek judicial enforcement of the
order and can challenge the validity of the order immediately in a federal
court. 
127
A. The Presumption of Reviewability
In Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner,128 the Supreme Court explained that
the APA embodies a basic presumption of judicial review for a person
adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action. 29 This presumption favoring
judicial review holds as long as no statute precludes review and the action is
not committed by law to agency discretion. 30 Thus, judicial review should
only be restricted upon a showing of "clear and convincing evidence" of a
Register); see also Harrsion v. PPG Indus., 446 U.S. 578, 589 (1980) (determining that the
phrase, "any other final action," in the absence of contrary legislative history, "must be
construed to mean exactly what it says, namely, any other final action").
127. See, e.g., Allsteel, Inc. v. EPA, 25 F.3d 312, 315 (6th Cir. 1994) (granting pre-
enforcement review to an ACO determined to be final agency action). An interesting
comparison of finality determinations can be drawn when looking at how courts have treated
section 113 compliance orders and section 113 notices of violation. See West Penn Power Co.
v. Train, 522 F.2d 302, 311 (3d Cir. 1975) (denying pre-enforcement review because the "effect
of a notice of violation is to make the recipient aware that the 'definitive' regulations are not
being met and to trigger the statutory mechanism for informal accommodation which precedes
any formal enforcement measures").
128. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967). In Abbott Laboratories, the
Commissioner of Food and Drugs published certain regulations requiring prescription drug
manufacturers to print specific information on drug labels and advertisements. Id. at 137-38.
Abbott Laboratories brought a pre-enforcement declaratory judgment action claiming that the
Commissioner had exceeded his authority in establishing a rule that required labels and other
printed materials to designate the established name of the drug "every time" its trade name was
used in such material. Id. at 139. The Court granted review in holding that the regulations
constituted final agency action. Id. at 149. The regulations were found to be "definitive"
statements of the agency's position that "have the status of law and violations of them carry
heavy criminal and civil sanctions." Id. at 152. Also, the impact on the regulated parties was
thought to have a "direct and immediate.., effect on the day-to-day business of all prescription
drug companies." Id.
129. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2000) ("A person suffering legal
wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the
meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof."); Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at
140 (1967) (discussing the limits on judicial review of agency action).
130. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 (2000) (providing exceptions for
cases in which statutes preclude review or agency action is committed to agency discretion by
law); Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 140 (discussing the APA's effect on the availability ofjudicial
review).
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contrary legislative intent. 131 This standard may be met not only by the express
language of the statute but also impliedly when the congressional intent to
preclude is "fairly discernible in the statutory scheme." 132 A court may find
implied preclusion by looking to the "structure of the statutory scheme, its
objectives, its legislative history, and the nature of the administrative action
involved."
133
B. What Constitutes Final Agency Action?
To obtain judicial review of an administrative agency's action, that action
must be final. 134 Courts have "interpreted the 'finality' element in a pragmatic
way,"'135 in order to further the "policies especially peculiar to finality" such as
agency efficiency and enforcement. 136 For example, in Abbott Laboratories,
the regulations at issue were held to constitute final agency action because they
were "definitive" statements of the agency's position that "have the status of
law" and carry with them potentially severe penalties.' 37 On the other hand, if
the agency action lacks an immediate legal or practical effect upon the
regulated party, the result of judicial review "is likely to be interference with
the proper functioning of the agency and a burden for the courts."'13 8 Thus, the
finality requirement allows an agency the opportunity to "correct its own
mistakes and to apply its expertise."'139 Premature judicial intervention into
agency action may also lead to "piecemeal review" that is inefficient and might
prove to have been unnecessary upon completion of the agency's process.
140
131. See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967) (discussing the presumption
of reviewability) (quoting Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367, 379-80 (1962)).
132. See Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 157 (1970)
(discussing the presumption in favor of reviewability absent clear congressional intent to the
contrary).
133. Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 345 (1984).
134. See ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMNlSTRATIVE LAW 411 (1993)
(discussing the requirements of final agency action); see also Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. § 704 (2000) ("Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for
which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review.").
135. Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 149.
136. See AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 134, at 412 (discussing the distinction between the
finality and exhaustion doctrines).
137. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 152 (1967).
138. FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232, 242 (1980).
139. See id. (discussing possible effects of premature judicial review).
140. See id. (concluding that judicial review of agency action that is not final would
interfere with the proper functioning of the agency and become a burden on the courts).
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C. The Bennett Test
The Supreme Court uses a general two-prong test for determining whether
an agency action is final. 41  First, the Court inquires whether "the [agency]
action mark[s] the consummation of the agency's decisionmaking process," and
is "not of a merely tentative or interlocutory nature." 142 In other words, the
agency's decision needs to be a final and binding determination as opposed to a
mere recommendation. 143 This consideration seeks to ensure that judicial
review will not disrupt the ordinary administrative process.' 44 Second, the
agency's action must determine rights or obligations, or be one from which
"legal consequences will flow."'145  In contrast to the first prong, this
requirement does not stem from a concern for the special functions of
administrative agencies. 146 This requirement derives from application of the
"traditional criteria for bringing judicial action into play.' 47 This criteria
includes the Constitution's Article III grant of judicial power to determine
"cases or controversies."' 48 It also encompasses the "procedural philosophy
pertaining to the federal courts," whereby "Congress has been loath to authorize
review of interim steps in a proceeding.' 49 Therefore, to satisfy the second
prong of the finality test, an agency action must at least order or require a party
to do, or refrain from doing, something; it must grant or withhold a power or
facility, subject the regulated party to civil or criminal liability, or change the
party's existing or future status or condition!'
5 0
141. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78(1997) (discussing the Bennett test for a
finality determination).
142. Id.
143. See Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 799 (1992) (concluding that a report
from the Secretary of Commerce to the President carried no direct consequences and thus served
as a tentative recommendation rather than a binding determination). "The core question is
whether the agency has completed its decisionmaking process, and whether the result of that
process is one that will directly affect the parties." Id. at 798.
144. See Port of Boston Marine Terminal Ass'n v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400
U.S. 62, 71 (1970) (discussing the relevant considerations in determining finality).
145. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 178.
146. See Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125, 131 (1939) (discussing the
limits of'judicial review of administrative action).
147. Id.
148. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (providing that "the judicial Power shall extend to all
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States...
[and] to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Part"); Rochester Tel. Corp., 307
U.S. at 131 (discussing the rationale behind requiring rights and obligations to change for a
finding of final agency action).
149. Rochester TeL Corp., 307 U.S. at 131.
150. See United States v. Los-Angeles & Salt Lake R.R. Co., 273 U.S. 299,309-10 (1927)
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D. The Circuit Split on Pre-enforcement Judicial Review ofACOs
For over twenty-five years, practitioners and courts have expressed
confusion over whether a regulated party may seek judicial review of an ACO
prior to an EPA initiated enforcement proceeding. 5' The majority approach,
denial of pre-enforcement review, clears judicial dockets and prevents a
potential flood of challenges to agency action that may be better dealt with at
the administrative level.15 2 Likewise, the EPA has, until recently, consistently
maintained that ACOs do not constitute final agency action and thus should not
be subject to pre-enforcement review.153 This position leaves full discretion to
the agency on whether to pursue an enforcement action, while enhancing its
leverage over the regulated party during negotiations.154 The agency benefits
from this posture because it can save its limited resources for litigation as a last
resort if negotiations fail. 155 Some courts recognize that this position may raise
due process concerns because regulated parties may feel compelled to comply
with an order or risk substantial accrual of monetary penalties while the EPA
procrastinates.1
56
(discussing the reviewability of agency orders).
151. See, e.g., Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. EPA, 554 F.2d 885, 886 (8th Cir. 1977)
(reviewing the issue of pre-enforcement judicial review of ACOs as a matter of first impression
in the courts of appeals). But see Allsteel, Inc. v. EPA, 25 F.3d 312, 315 (6th Cir. 1994)
(permitting pre-enforcement review of a stop-work order because the order constituted "final"
agency action).
152. See Asbestec Constr. Servs., Inc. v. EPA, 849 F.2d 765, 766 (2d Cir. 1988) (noting
that to grant pre-enforcement review of an ACO would burden appellate courts and shackle the
EPA from performing its duty of speeding-up the prevention and control of air pollution).
153. In Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation v. EPA, the EPA maintained
its long-held position that ACOs did not constitute final agency action when the case was before
the Ninth Circuit. Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 244 F.3d 748, 750 (9th Cir.
2001). When the case was heard by the Supreme Court, however, the Solicitor General, arguing
on behalf of the EPA, reversed the EPA's position and agreed with the Ninth Circuit that the
ACO in this case did constitute final agency action. Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v.
EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 483 (2004). This was apparently the first time the agency had taken this
position.
154. See Clean Air Act § 113(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(4) (2000) (providing that an order
under this Section may not take effect until the person to whom it is issued has had an
opportunity to confer with the Administrator).
155. See Miskiewicz & Rudd, supra note 77, at 310 (discussing the EPA's limited
enforcement resources).
156. See Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461,483 (2004) (noting
that the parties did not raise any question as to the adequacy of the EPA's preorder procedures
under the Due Process Clause, which implies that the Court noticed the potential for concern);
Rueth v. United States, 13 F.3d 227, 230-31 (7th Cir. 1993) (suggesting that if the EPA goes
too far in leaving a regulated party in limbo before initiating an enforcement action subsequent
to an ACO, the court would not hesitate to intervene in pre-enforcement activity).
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1. The Majority Approach
To date, the Second, Third, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits have held that ACOs are not subject to pre-enforcement judicial review
under the CAA or the CWA.'57 These courts have primarily based their
decisions on theories of statutory preclusion and lack of finality.'
a. Implied Statutory Preclusion: Lloyd A. Fry Roofing v. EPA
The Eighth Circuit addressed the issue ofpre-enforcement review ofACOs
for the first time in Lloyd A. Fry Roofing, Co. v. EPA. 159 In Lloyd A. Fry
Roofing, the EPA ordered an asphalt roofing plant to eliminate certain CAA
violations in its visible emissions.' 60 The company filed a complaint challenging
the order and claimed that an exception under the CAA applied to its
emissions. 161 The Eighth Circuit rejected the company's challenge and concluded
that the statutory structure of the CAA impliedly precluded review of ACOs.162
First, the legislative history of the Act indicated that the Conference Committee
deleted language from the House and Senate versions of the bill that would have
expressly provided for judicial review of compliance orders. 63  The Eighth
157. See, e.g., Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Whitman, 336 F.3d 1236, 1259 (11th Cir. 2003)
(concluding that ACOs lack finality because they do not pass the two prong Bennett test); Acker
v. EPA, 290 F.3d 892, 894 (7th Cir. 2002) (reasoning that because an ACO has no legal force
except to impose upon a party the already existing burden of complying with the CAA, the order
could not be final agency action); Laguna Gatuna, Inc. v. Browner, 58 F.3d 564, 565 (10th Cir.
1995) (following the reasoning of Southern Pines and other sister circuits in concluding that an
ACO under the CWA is precluded from review by the legislative history and language of the
Act); Southern Pines Assocs. ex rel. Goldmeier v. United States, 912 F.2d 713, 716 (4th Cir.
1990) (discussing the legislative history of the Act and analogous environmental statutes in
concluding Congress intended to preclude judicial review of compliance orders); Solar
Turbines, Inc. v. Seif, 879 F.2d 1073, 1078-82 (3d Cir. 1989) (concluding that the statutory
structure of the CAA precludes review, and furthermore, the agency action was not final).
158. See Andrew I. Davis, Judicial Review of Environmental Compliance Orders, 24
.ENVTL. L. 189, 195-217 (1994) (discussing the decisions and theories by which ACOs have
been denied review).
159. See Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. EPA, 554 F.2d 885, 890-91 (8th Cir. 1977)
(reviewing the issue of pre-enforcement judicial review of ACOs as a matter of first impression
in the courts of appeals).
160. Id. at 887.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 890-91 (finding that the legislative history and statutory structure of the CAA
demonstrate convincing evidence that Congress intended to preclude judicial review of an
abatement order).
163. See id. at 890 ("Any person subject to [an abatement order] and who undertakes
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Circuit acknowledged that the legislative record contained no indication of the
reason for the deletion but interpreted the deletion to suggest that "the intent of
the omitted portion was rejected in the bill as passed." 64
Second, the court determined that pre-enforcement judicial review was
inconsistent with the Section 113 enforcement scheme established by
Congress.165 Pre-enforcement review would "severely limit the effectiveness of
the [the EPA's informal] conference procedures as a means to abate violations of
the Act without resort to the judicial process." 16 This approach could lead to the
agency sidestepping pre-enforcement review by filing suit in a district court
without issuing an ACO. 167 The court noted the possibility of the accrual of large
fines and criminal penalties but concluded that a party could protect itself from
the unconscionable accumulation of large fines by invoking the equitable doctrine
of laches if the EPA fails to promptly seek enforcement. 68 In sum, the Eighth
Circuit concluded that Lloyd Fry Roofing's only recourse was to assert its claims
as a defense or counterclaim in an enforcement action brought by the EPA. 169
b. Final Agency Action: Solar Turbines, Inc. v. Seif
The Third Circuit reached the same outcome on different reasoning in Solar
Turbines, Inc. v. Seif.170 In Solar Turbines, the EPA issued an ACO pursuant to
compliance with such order shall not be foreclosed from instituting in the United States district
court for the district in which the alleged violation occurred an action against the Secretary to
challenge such order.").
164. See id. (discussing the contents of the proposed bills). But see Davis, supra note 158,
at 199 (arguing that the unexplained deletion is not conclusive of legislative intent and thus fell
short of the "clear and convincing evidence" standard for judicial review of administrative
action established inAbbottLaboratories v. Gardner). Davis goes on to argue that even under
the less demanding analysis of Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, the deletion did not erase
"substantial doubt about the congressional intent" to preclude review and thus the general
presumption favoring judicial review of administrative action should control. Id. Davis
suggests that a reasonable interpretation of the deletion is that Congress saw no need to include
the affirmative intent to include judicial review. Id. To do so would have been redundant and
unnecessary because the case law established a strong presumption in favor ofjudicial review of
final agency decisions. Id.
165. See Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. EPA, 554 F.2d 885, 891 (8thCir. 1977) (interpreting
the CAA to preclude pre-enforcement review).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See Solar Turbines, Inc. v. Seif, 879 F.2d 1073, 1082 (3d Cir. 1989) (concluding that
an EPA order issued under Section 167 did not constitute final agency action and was thus
unreviewable). The first court to address the issue after LloydA. Fry Roofing was the Second
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Section 167 of the CAA ordering Solar Turbines to cease construction of a gas
turbine facility. 171 The state of Pennsylvania had issued a construction permit to
the company without providing for controls on nitrogen oxide emissions. 172 The
EPA determined that the company's failure to install the "best available control
technology" for nitrogen oxide emissions would violate air quality permit
requirements and thus ordered the company to stop construction. 173 On appeal,
the Third Circuit dismissed the challenger's claim for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, reasoning that the agency's action was not final because no civil or
criminal liabilities flowed from the violation of a Section 167 order. 174 The court
found that the only meaningful enforcement mechanism under a Section 167
order is for the EPA to pursue injunctive relief in the district court.175 The court
concluded that because the company was not compelled to obey the order at the
risk of sanctions and the order did not impose severe hardship on the company,
the order was not final and therefore not subject to judicial review.
176
Surprisingly, the Third Circuit failed to realize that violation of a Section
167 order may actually subject a party to criminal and civil penalties under
Sections 113(a) and (b).177 The court seems to have ignored or missed that these
provisions provide for the same penalties that exist for violating Section 113
orders.178 Therefore, the court's reasoning may have led to the opposite result had
it realized penalties may accrue for the underlying violation of the Act or the
violation of the order.
c. Review ofACOs Under the Clean Water Act
Based on similar reasoning, courts have denied pre-enforcement review of
ACOs under the CWA. 17 9  In Southern Pines Associations v. United
Circuit in Asbestec Construction Services v. EPA. See Asbestec Constr. Serv., Inc. v. EPA, 849
F.2d 765, 769 (2d Cir. 1988) (concluding that an ACO was not final agency action because the
regulated party failed to show its duties or obligations had been altered by the ACO).
171. Solar Turbines, 879 F.2d at 1076.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1081.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1082.
177. See Clean Air Act § 113(b)(2), (c)(l), 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (b)(2), (c)(1) (2000)
(providing for civil and criminal penalties for violating any order approved under this Act,
including Section 167).
178. See id. (providing criminal liability for knowingly violating a Section 167 order).
179. See, e.g., Rueth v. United States, 13 F.3d 227, 230 (7th Cir. 1993) (affirming the
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States, 80 the EPA ordered Southern Pines to cease filling activities in a wetland
because the company did not have a permit required by Section 301(a) of the
CWA. 18 The Fourth Circuit agreed with the Seventh Circuit that the structure
of the CWA evinces clear and convincing evidence that Congress impliedly
precluded judicial review of ACOs except in an EPA initiated enforcement
proceeding.1 12 Reasoning that "[b]ecause the compliance order does not alter
Southern Pines' obligations under the Act, and the EPA can bring a suit
whether or not it issues an order," the court noted that "Southern Pines [is] not
faced with any greater threat from the EPA just because the agency seeks to
negotiate a solution rather than to institute civil proceedings immediately.
'18 3
The Fourth Circuit also considered the EPA's enforcement authority under
other environmental statutes.1 4 For example, prior to 1986, courts held that
pre-enforcement remedial actions taken by the EPA under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) were
not subject to judicial 'review because litigation would interfere with
CERCLA' s policy of prompt agency response.18 5 In 1986, Congress amended
CERCLA to include a provision that specifically precludes federal jurisdiction
over pre-enforcement remedial action.
1 86
The Fourth Circuit found that the structure of the environmental statutes in
general indicates congressional intent to allow the EPA to address
environmental problems quickly without becoming immediately entangled in
litigation.1 87 The court bolstered this theory by noting that the CWA is not only
similar in structure to the CAA and CERCLA, but Congress consciously
district court dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the Clean Water Act
compliance order was not final agency action); United States v. Outboard Marine Corp., 789
F.2d 497, 505-06 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that the language of CERCLA expressly precludes
pre-enforcement review).
180. See Southern Pines Assocs. ex rel. Goldmeierv. United States, 912 F.2d 713,716 (4th
Cir. 1990) (finding that the ACO issued under the CWA did not have the force of law because
the order did not alter the regulated parties' obligations under the Act).
181. Id. at 714.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 716.
185. See id. (discussing treatment of ACOs under CERCLA) (citing Wagner Seed Co. v.
Daggett, 800 F.2d 310, 315 (2d Cir. 1986)); Wheaton Industries v. EPA, 781 F.2d 354,356-57
(3d Cir. 1986); United States v. Outboard Marine Corp., 789 F.2d 497, 505-06 (7th Cir. 1986).
186. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (2000) ("No Federal court shall have jurisdiction under
Federal law other than under section 1332 of Title 28 ... or to review any order issued under
section 9606(a) of this title. .. ").
187. See Southern Pines Assocs. ex rel. Goldmeier v. United States, 912 F.2d 713,716 (4th
Cir. 1990) (comparing enforcement schemes under various environmental statutes).
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modeled the CWA's enforcement provisions after those of the CAA. 181
Nevertheless, Southern Pines argued that it had been denied its due process
rights of notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to the issuance of the
ACO. 189 The court rejected the claim and concluded that the company's due
process rights were not violated because Southern Pines was not subject to an
injunction or penalties until an EPA-initiated enforcement action.190 Only then
would the company have an opportunity to make their constitutional
arguments.' 9' Other circuits have agreed with the result and analysis in
Southern Pines, including the Tenth Circuit in Laguna Gatuna, Inc. v.
Browner192 and the Seventh Circuit in Rueth v. EPA.1 93
188. See id. (noting the similarities in the statutory structures of the CAA and CWA)
(citing S. REP. No. 92-414, at 63 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3730).
189. Id. at 717.
190. See id. (discussing Southern Pines's due process challenge).
191. See id. (rejecting the challenger's due process argunients) (citing Hoffman Group, Inc.
v. EPA, 902 F.2d 567 (7th Cir. 1990)).
192. Laguna Gatuna, Inc. v. Browner, 58 F.3d 564 (10th Cir. 1995). In this case, the
Laguna Gatuna company dumped industrial waste water into a sinkhole in New Mexico. Id. at
565. After finding dead migratory birds near the sinkhole, the EPA issued a compliance order
under the CWA directing the company to cease its dumping activities. Id. The company filed
an action in the district court, claiming that the EPA had no jurisdiction over its activities
because the sinkhole was not part of the "waters of the United States," and the order violated the
company's procedural and substantive due process rights. Id. The Tenth Circuit relied on the
reasoning of its sister circuits as set forth in Southern Pines and in Rueth v. EPA. The court
agreed that the legislative history and text of the CWA indicate that Congress meant to preclude
judicial review of compliance orders under the CWA. Id. at 566. Acknowledging that the
company had strong due process arguments, the court nonetheless held that the order was not
constitutionally intolerable and that allowing judicial review of every EPA compliance order
would undermine the EPA's regulatory authority. Id.; see also Hoffman Group, Inc. v. EPA,
902 F.2d 567, 570 (7th Cir. 1990) (concluding that the CWA compliance order scheme was a
detailed mechanism that impliedly precluded review of a compliance order because the only
means to compel compliance was through an EPA enforcement proceeding, at which time the
recipient can challenge the order).
193. Rueth v. United States, 13 F.3d 227 (7th Cir. 1993). In Rueth, the EPA issued a
compliance order under Section 309(a) of the CWA requiring that Rueth cease all discharges
into an area considered wetlands. Id. at 228. The agency found that the defendant had filled
three acres of wetlands and navigable waters without a permit. Id. The Seventh Circuit agreed
with its own reasoning in Hoffnan that the CWA provides for judicial review only when the
agency seeks judicial enforcement of an order, or the agency seeks administrative penalties. Id.
at 231 (citing Howell v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 794 F. Supp. 1072, 1075
(D.N.M. 1992)) ("[F]orcing the agency into litigation before it completes its wetlands
delineation and permitting process will frustrate the statutory scheme that allows the agency to
resolve violations in a flexible manner without judicial interference"). The court added that "the
cease-and-desist letter is not 'final agency action .... ' [It] is only the beginning of the
administrative process, not its consummation." Id.
1906
FACING A HOBSON'S CHOICE 1907
2. The Minority Approach
The Sixth and Ninth Circuits have held that pre-enforcement review of
compliance orders is available in the context of construction or modification of
new stationary sources of air pollution under Sections 1 13(a)(5) and 167 of the
CAA.1 94 In contrast to the majority approach, the Sixth Circuit found no
express or implied congressional intent to deny pre-enforcement review.'
95 In
both cases, the burden placed on the regulated party was the decisive factor in
determining that the agency action was final.1
96
a. The Sixth Circuit's New Approach: Allsteel, Inc. v. EPA
The first federal appellate court to depart from the established treatment of
ACOs was the Sixth Circuit in Allsteel, Inc. v. EPA. 9 s In Allsteel, the EPA
issued an order to Allsteel, Inc., a steel company, to cease construction of a
manufacturing facility in Tennessee. 98 The EPA believed Allsteel was in
violation of the CAA even though the company was acting under the authority
194. See Clean Air Act § 11 3(a)(5),42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(5) (2000) (authorizing the EPA to
issue compliance order for failure to comply with New Source Review requirements). New
Source Review (NSR) is a CAA program which subjects large new stationary sources of air
pollution and, under certain circumstances, changes at large existing sources, to preconstruction
review and permitting requirements. Clean Air Act § 111, 42 U.S.C. § 7411. The nature of
these requirements depends on whether the source is located in an area that has attained or failed
to attain the National Ambient Air Quality Standard for a given pollutant. Id. One of the most
debated issues that arises in the context of the NSR program is the same issue that gave rise to
the dispute in TVA I. Mamie Riddle, Note, Interpreting the Relevance of Economic Harm in
the Clean Air Act: Tennessee Valley Authority v. EPA, 30 EcoLOGY L.Q. 617, 622 (2003).
That is the issue of whether changes at an existing air pollution source will constitute
"modification" (requiring a permit) or "routine maintenance" (exempt from permit
requirements). Id.
195. See Allsteel, Inc. v. EPA, 25 F.3d 312, 314 (6th Cir. 1994) (noting that courts must
presume the availability ofjudicial review absent clear and convincing evidence of a contrary
legislative intent). The court noted that Section 307(b) of the CAA granted review of final
agency action and stated that this affirmatively suggested that Congress provided no other
indication of intent to preclude review of ACOs. Id.
196. See Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 244 F.3d 748, 750 (9th Cir. 2001)
(determining that the effect of the order would cost a considerable amount of time and money to
the challenger); Allsteel, Inc. v. EPA, 25 F.3d 312, 315 (6th Cir. 1994) (concluding that the
ACO could jeopardize the very survival of Allsteel).
197. See Allsteel, 25 F.3d at 315 (finding an EPA stop construction order that imposed a
new obligation and the threat of civil and criminal penalties to be suitable for pre-enforcement
review).
198. Id. at 313.
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of a state-issued permit.'99 The Sixth Circuit determined that Congress did not
exhibit any express or implied intent to bar pre-enforcement judicial review of
administrative orders under the CAA. 20 0 The court supported this notion with
language of the CAA that provides review in the Courts of Appeals for "any
other final action of the Administrator. 20'°  This provision was sufficient to
indicate that Congress had not evinced "clear and convincing evidence" of an
intent to preclude review of these orders.2 °2
The court also found that the impact of the order was practical and
203immediate. For example, the ACO required Allsteel to cease building a
major new facility, which prevented the company from pursuing its business
interests in an efficient manner and potentially endangered the firm's
survival. 204 An order stopping construction on such a project imposes a new
obligation, one not directly imposed by the CAA, and violation of that order
could result in civil and criminal penalties. 2 5 Thus, the ACO was held to
constitute final agency action.20 6
Judge Wellford's concurrence noted the possibility of due process
concerns in the compliance order scheme.20 7 He did not accept that Congress
intended to give the EPA unreviewable authority to halt construction of a major
plant-before the plant had released any emissions-without a full-scale
hearing to determine whether the state-approved emissions system was in
violation of the applicable laws.20 8 Judge Wellford also noted that, in this case,
the EPA made no effort to initiate an enforcement action, rather the agency was
content that it had stopped construction, that Allsteel had no remedy in court,
199. Id.
200. Id. at 314. But see S. Ohio Coal v. Office of Surface Mining, Reclamation and
Enforcement, 20 F.3d 1418, 1427 (6th Cir. 1994) (concluding from the structure of the CWA
that Congress had intended to preclude pre-enforcement review under that Act).
201. Allsteel, 25 F.3d at 314.
202. Id.; Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967) (explaining that absent clear
and convincing evidence of a contrary Congressional intent courts should not restrict access to
judicial review).
203. See Allsteel, 25 F.3d at 314 (noting that a stop-construction order on a new facility
had practical and immediate effects on the company).
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. See id. at 316 (Wellford, J., concurring) (discussing the potential draconian
consequences of indefinite delay of enforcement by the EPA).
208. See id. (Wellford, J., concurring) (noting that not every ACO would be considered
final agency action but only in cases with an unusual fact situation such as that in Allsteel would
the court deem an order final).
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and that it would need to seek approval from the EPA for further action.209 The
judge argued that if the EPA did not bring an enforcement action within a
reasonable time under these circumstances, the CAA "could be unenforceable
as violative of constitutional due process.t
20
b. The Ninth Circuit Weighs in on Finality: Alaska Department of
Environmental Conservation v. EPA
The second court to allow pre-enforcement review of an ACO was the
Ninth Circuit in Alaska Department ofEnvironmental Conservation v. EPA. 2
In that case, the EPA issued three enforcement orders that invalidated an air
quality construction permit issued by state regulators to Cominco for the
construction of a power generator at Cominco's Alaskan mining facility.212 The
Department challenged the EPA's authority to invalidate the permit under
federal and state law.2 3 The EPA argued that it had authority to regulate such
construction under the CAA and that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider
the claim because the ACOs were not final agency action and thus
214unreviewable until the agency commenced an enforcement action.
The Ninth Circuit disagreed, holding that the EPA's orders satisfied both
prongs of the Bennett finality test.215 First, the agency had asserted its final
position on the factual circumstances upon which the ACOs were made'.
2 6
Indeed, the EPA admitted that its position would change only if the
circumstances surrounding the construction changed. 2 7 Second, the orders
determined the rights and obligations of the parties in the sense that the effect
of the order was to halt construction at the Mine facility at a considerable cost
209. Id. (Wellford, J., concurring).
210. Id. (Wellford, J., concurring).
211. See Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 244 F.3d 748,749 (9th Cir. 2001),
aft'd, 540 U.S. 461 (2004) (holding that the EPA's ACO represented the agency's "final
position on the factual circumstances," and that the legal consequences would follow if the order
were disregarded because the orders had determined the rights and obligations of the parties and
thus was reviewable).
212. Id. at 749.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 750.
215. See id. at 750 (concluding that the EPA had asserted its final position and determined
the rights and obligations of Cominco). For a discussion of finality see supra Part III.C
(discussing the application of the Bennett test to agency action).
216. See id. at 750 (stating the EPA's position that if Cominco were to build the generator
using low NOx technology it would be in violation of the CAA, the Alaskan SIP, and the ACO).
217. See id. (noting that the EPA's position was final).
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of both time and money to Cominco. 28 Third, legal consequences would flow
in the form ofjudicial penalties if Cominco disobeyed the order.219 In short, the
court weighed the unalterable nature of the EPA's position with the great
burden that the challenger would suffer in holding this ACO final.22°
When the case was heard by the Supreme Court in 2004, the EPA reversed
its position and agreed with the Ninth Circuit that this particular order did in
fact constitute final agency action.22' The EPA admitted that, under the myriad
of "pragmatic considerations" involved in a finality determination, the ACO in
question was indeed final.222 Perhaps this reversal was a strategic decision,
designed to take advantage of the Ninth Circuit's favorable ruling on the
223merits. In previous cases, the agency consistently maintained that
compliance orders do not constitute final agency action.224 The Supreme Court
agreed with the Ninth Circuit's finality ruling and noted its satisfaction in the
lower court's application of the Bennett test.225 Curiously, the Court noted that
no issue had been raised about the adequacy of the EPA's pre-order procedures
218. See id. (discussing the effects of the orders on the regulated party).
219. See id. (noting that the EPA could request, and the district court could assess,
penalties for Cominco's alleged violation of the CAA's Prevention of Significant Deterioration
requirements and for alleged violation of the order). The court also noted that their review of
the case would not benefit from further factual development of the record as the question of who
bore ultimate responsibility to decide what emissions reductions were required from which
sources under the CAA is a legal question. Id. at 750-51.
220. Id. at 750-51.
221. See Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461,483 (2004) (noting
that, in this Court, the EPA agreed with the Ninth Circuit's finality determination).
222. See Brief of Respondent EPA at 16, Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540
U.S. 461 (2004) [hereinafter Brief of Respondent EPA] (discussing the application of the
Bennett test to the ACO in this case) (citing FTC v. Standard Oil, 449 U.S. 232, 239-43
(1980)).
223. See Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 298 F.3d 814, 816 (9th Cir. 2002),
aff'd, 540 U.S. 461 (2004) (holding that the EPA did not abuse its discretion and acted within
its authority in determining that the state agency BACT determinations did not comply with the
CAA or the Alaskan SIP).
224. See, e.g., Solar Turbines, Inc. v. Seif, 879 F.2d 1073, 1076 (3d Cir. 1989) (arguing
that the CAA precludes pre-enforcement review of Section 167 administrative orders); Asbestec
Constr. Serv., Inc. v. EPA, 849 F.2d 765, 768 (2d Cir. 1988) (discussing the EPA's argument
that an ACO is not final because an enforcement proceeding is still available) (citing Lloyd A.
Fry Roofing Co. v. EPA, 554 F.2d 885, 891-92 (8th Cir. 1977)). For an idea of why the EPA
might prefer to maintain that ACOs are not final agency action see supra notes 152-54 and
accompanying text (describing the benefit to the agency in issuing nonreviewable orders).
225. See Alaska, 540 U.S. at 483 (discussing the Ninth Circuit's application of the finality
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under the Due Process Clause or the APA but did not discuss the issue
further.226
IV. The ACO Enforcement Scheme Is Held Unconstitutional: The Eleventh
Circuit's Novel Approach in TVA v. Whitman
Although several courts had mentioned possible due process concerns
with the ACO scheme in dicta, no court had passed judgment on the issue until
the Eleventh Circuit did so in TVA 11.227 In that case, the court found the ACO
scheme itself repugnant to the Due Process Clause and separation of powers
principles.228
A. The Controversy
As a result of its broad enforcement powers and its goal of attaining global
multi-facility settlements, the EPA has zealously pursued entire industries
suspected of endemic CAA violations.229 Nowhere is this more obvious than
with alleged violations of the CAA's New Source Review (NSR) program
pertaining to stationary sources of air pollution.230 The NSR program requires a
complex analysis before a new major stationary source of air pollution is
constructed or before an existing stationary source undergoes a major
modification.23' In this context, the EPA has initiated enforcement actions
226. Id. This curious line in the opinion could be read to suggest that the Court was
harboring reservations on the due process issues raised by the ACO scheme but was not willing
to raise issues that were not briefed and argued by the parties.
227. See, e.g., Laguna Gatuna, Inc. v. Browner, 58 F.3d 564, 566 (10th Cir. 1995) (noting
the strength of Laguna's policy argument that is should not be necessary to violate an EPA order
and risk civil penalties to obtain judicial review but ultimately holding that this situation was
nonetheless not constitutionally intolerable); Allsteel, Inc. v. EPA, 25 F.3d 312, 316 (6th Cir.
1994) (Wellford, J., concurring) (explaining that to not hold a stop-work order final agency
action and deny pre-enforcement review would involve serious due process concerns).
228. See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Whitman, 336 F.3d 1236, 1258-59 (11th Cir. 2003)
(discussing the constitutional problems the court viewed as inherent in the statutory scheme).
229. See Domike & Zacaroli, supra note 76, at 567 (discussing the EPA's broadened scope
of authority granted under the 1990 Amendments to the CAA).
230. Id.; see also Bernard F. Hawkins, Jr. & Mary Ellen Temes, The New Source Review
Program: Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Nonattainment New Source Review, in
THE CLEAN AIR AcT HANDBOOK 131, 136 (Robert J. Martineau, Jr. & David P. Novello eds., 2d.
ed. 2004) (discussing the general framework of the New Source Review program). New or
modified major stationary sources that may emit one or more of the regulated pollutants at
certain thresholds must undergo new source review to obtain construction permits. Id.
231. See id. (outlining the NSR program's general focus); see also Clean Air Act
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against petroleum refiners, the pulp and paper industry, and large utilities.232
An action against utilities gave rise to the dispute in TVA 11.233
The Tennessee Valley Authority is a unique federal agency charged with
providing electric power to portions of the southeastern United States.234
Controversies involving the CAA are very familiar to the TVA. 235 In 1999,
the TVA became entangled with the EPA in yet another dispute.236 From
1982 to 1996, the TVA undertook fourteen rehabilitation projects, including
replacing boilers at nine of its coal-fired electric power plants.237 The EPA
determined that these projects were "modifications" and not merely "routine
maintenance., 238 Thus, the EPA concluded that the project triggered New
§ 11 l(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 741 l(a)(3) (2000) (defining a stationary source as "any building,
structure, facility, or installation which emits or may emit any air pollutant"); Clean Air Act
§ 112(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a)(1) (2000) (defining a "major source" as any stationary source
or group of stationary sources within a contiguous area and under common control that emit in
the aggregate more than ten tons per year of any hazardous pollutant or more than twenty-five
tons per year of any combination of hazardous pollutants).
232. See Domike & Zacaroli, supra note 76, at 568 (describing the scope of some of the
EPA's enforcement actions against entire industries). The EPA's position on power plants is
that for many years a large number of plants have operated without the best available emissions
control technology and as a result have increased the pollution in the surrounding areas and
downwind of the facilities along the Eastern Seaboard. 2002 EPA Accomplishments Report,
supra note 96, at 22. The primary pollutants emitted by the power plants that the EPA is
concerned with are sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, and particulate matter which cause adverse
environmental and health impacts, particularly on asthma sufferers, the elderly, and children.
Id.
233. See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Whitman, 278 F.3d 1184, 1189 (lth Cir. 2002)
(describing the factual development of the suit that evolved into TVA II).
234. 16 U.S.C. § 831 n-4(h) (2000). The TVA is a unique agency in that it was created as a
federal agency with the intention that it should have "much of the essential freedom and
elasticity of a private business corporation." H.R. REP. No. 73-130, at 19 (1933). For example,
the TVA is run by a Board of Directors and the agency's personnel are not subject to the
personnel laws normally applicable to federal officers and employees. 16 U.S.C. §§ 831a(g),
83 1b (2000).
235. Dean Hill Rivkin, The TVA Air Pollution Conflict: The Dynamics of Public Law
Advocacy, 49 TENN. L. REV. 843, 844 (1982) (discussing litigation between the EPA and the
TVA in the seventies when the TVA was the heaviest polluter of sulfur dioxide in the nation).
236. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Whitman, 336 F.3d 1236, 1236 (1 lth Cir. 2003).
237. Id. at 1239.
238. See Clean Air Act § I l(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 741 1(a)(4) (2000) (defining
"modification" as "any physical change in, or change in the method of operation of, a stationary
source which increases the amount of any air pollutant emitted by such source or which results
in the emission of any air pollutant not previously emitted"); 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(2)(iii)(a)
(providing that "[a] physical change in the method of operation shall not include.., routine
maintenance, repair and replacement"); see also Robert A. Greco, Comment, When is Routine
Maintenance Really Routine? A Proposed Modification to the EPA's New Source Review
Program, 88 MARQ. L. REv. 391, 393-95 (2004) (analyzing the history of the routine
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Source Review permitting requirements. 239
In November of 1999, the EPA issued an ACO that required the TVA to
identify modifications taken without permits, apply for those permits, and enter
into compliance agreements with the EPA.240 Even after a series of
negotiations and amendments to the ACO, the TVA refused to comply with the
order because it argued that the modifications constituted routine maintenance
and that no increase in emissions could be traced to the modifications.241 Next,
the EPA took an unusual step and sent the controversy to an Environmental
Appeals Board (EAB) to adjudicate the question of whether the TVA was
liable for a CAA violation.242 Undoubtedly, part of the Eleventh Circuit's
displeasure with the EPA's actions stemmed from the EAB proceedings that
"lacked the virtues of most agency adjudications., 243 The EAB affmned most
of the amended ACO and entered a "final order" in favor of the EPA's
position.244  The TVA then sought review of the EAB's decision in the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.245
B. Constitutional Violations
Aside from its argument before the Supreme Court in Alaska, the EPA has
long taken the position that ACOs are not final agency action and thus are not
subject to pre-enforcement judicial review.2 " Of course, this is a logical
position for the EPA as it enhances the agency's leverage over alleged
maintenance issue as applied to electric power plants).
239. TVA II, 336 F.3d at 1244.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 1245. The EPA did not bring an enforcement proceeding in the district court
because its position was that there was no justiciable case or controversy. Tenn.Valley Auth. v.
Whitman, 278 F.3d 1184, 1193 (1lth Cir. 2002). The EPA maintained that two executive
branch agencies serving at the pleasure of the President may not engage in litigation on the
theory that commonly controlled agencies lack the concrete adversity necessary for an Art. Il
case or controversy (i.e. "a person may not sue himself'). Id. Thus, the EPA chose an ad hoc
review procedure before its own Environmental Appeals Board (EAB) in order to determine the
legitimacy of the ACO. Id.
243. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Whitman, 336 F.3d 1236, 1245-46 (1 1th Cir. 2003).
244. Id. at 1246.
245. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (2000) (providing for judicial review of final agency action).
246. See supra notes 152-55 and accompanying text (explaining why the EPA has
maintained that ACOs do not constitute final agency action). But see Alaska Dep't of Envtl.
Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 483 (2004) (noting that in front of this Court, the EPA
agreed with the Ninth Circuit's determination that the ACO constituted final agency action).
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offenders and avoids delaying enforcement actions indefinitely in a web of
legal proceedings while the threat to the public health and the environment
remains. 247 Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit disapproved of the fact that the
EPA adopted a different position in court than it did toward the regulated
party. 248 The court described the EPA's posturing as "employing the harsh
provisions of the CAA when confronting a potentially recalcitrant party, but
hesitant to reveal the legal significance of ACOs in court for fear that the very
part of the CAA that makes ACOs so effective will be struck down.2 49 The
Eleventh Circuit found that the ACO scheme used in this context was
repugnant to the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
The court offered two justifications for this result, beginning with the
problem of procedural due process. 251 The problem stems from the fact that the
CAA grants authority to an executive agency to issue orders with the force of
law "on the basis of any information available" to the Administrator that a CAA
violation has occurred.25 2 The court reasoned that, before the government may
impose severe civil and criminal penalties, the defendant is entitled to a full and
fair hearing before an impartial tribunal.253 The court found that the ACO
scheme deprived the regulated party the opportunity to be heard and to present
evidence on whether the conduct underlying the ACO took place and whether
the conduct constitutes a violation of the CAA. 2 4
Next, the court determined that the CAA scheme unconstitutionally
delegates judicial power to a non-Article Ill entity. The Eleventh Circuit's
concern was that the CAA's statutory scheme "relegates Article IIl courts to
247. See Miskiewicz & Rudd, supra note 77, at 329 (1992) (discussing how the CAA's
1990 Amendments affected the availability of pre-enforcement review of compliance orders).
248. See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Whitman, 336 F.3d 1236, 1251 (1lth Cir. 2003)
(discussing the inconsistency that the EPA displayed in court compared to how it treated the
regulated party).
249. Id.
250. See TVA II, 336 F.3d at 1258 (discussing the constitutional violations the court found
in the ACO scheme); see also U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing that no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law).
251. See id. at 1258 (discussing the procedural due process and sQparation of powers
problems the ACO scheme raises).
252. Id.
253. See id. (concluding that the ACO scheme did not afford a regulated party an adequate
hearing) (citing Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). For a more in depth
discussion of the requirements of procedural due process in the context of administrative law
see Krauss, supra note 23, at 820-25 (discussing the general requirements of a valid due process
claim).
254. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Whitman, 336 F.3d 1236, 1258 (1 1th Cir. 2003).
255. Id.
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insignificant tribunals" by allowing the district courts to serve as fora for the EPA to
conduct proceedings akin to "show-cause hearings."256 Similarly, in the Eleventh
Circuit's view, the appellate courts are reduced to reviewing only whether the ACO
was validly issued, rather than deciding whether the conduct in question actually
violates the statute.
257
C. The Eleventh Circuit's Conclusion
The TVA HIcourt ultimately held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the ACOs
because the orders did not cunstitute final agency action, and the court reached that
result in a novel way.258 The court pointed out that when the EPA uses any of the
other three enforcement methods,25 9 the defendant may make legal and factual
arguments in an independent forum that will enable a defendant to utilize all of his
pre-established procedural rights;26 the ACO does not afford a defendant these
same rights. 261 Although the CAA empowers the EPA to "issue ACOs that have
the status of law," the court held "the statutory scheme unconstitutional to the extent
that severe civil and criminal penalties can be imposed for noncompliance with the
terms of an ACO. ' 262 Accordingly, the opinion concluded that ACOs are legally
inconsequential and thus do not constitute final agency action.
263
V. Analyzing TVA v. Whitman: Should Courts Follow the Eleventh Circuit?
Although the Eleventh Circuit's novel decision raised important questions,
other circuits should not follow its reasoning. The decision unnecessarily read
256. Id. at 1259.
257. See id. (noting that the appellate courts are emasculated in this scheme to reviewing
only whether the ACO has validly issued, that is to say based on "any information available" as
opposed to no information at all).
258. See id. at 1239 (holding that ACOs are legally inconsequential because the statutory
scheme is unconstitutional).
259. See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text (discussing the EPA's enforcement
options under Section 113 of the CAA).
260. See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Whitman, 336 F.3d 1236, 1241 (11th Cir. 2003)
(discussing the EPA's various enforcement options).
261. See id. (reasoning that an ACQ's injunction-like legal status coupled with the laclk of
opportunity for adjudication or meaningfil judicial review create due process problems for the
CAA enforcement scheme).
262. Id.
263. See id. (concluding that because ACOs are not final agency action, they are not
reviewable by courts of appeals).
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constitutional problems into the CAA statutory structure, misinterpreted key
provisions of the statute, and broke from an established line of case law in the
treatment of ACOs.
A. Statutory Interpretation: The Doctrine of Constitutional Doubt
A basic tenet of statutory interpretation, known as the doctrine of
"constitutional doubt," provides that "courts are loath to infer a congressional
intention to enact unconstitutional legislation. '264  The Eleventh Circuit
previously adopted this doctrine in concluding that "where an otherwise
acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems,
[we] will construe the statute to avoid the problems unless such a construction
is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress., 265  Despite the fact that
constitutional issues were neither raised nor briefed by the parties in TVA II, the
Eleventh Circuit unnecessarily read due process problems into the statute.26
A reasonable reading of the ACO provisions of the CAA avoids the
constitutional difficulties alluded to in TVA II. In Alaska, the EPA argued that
the underlying merits of ACOs are always subject to judicial review, whether
by petition for review to a court of appeals, or in an enforcement action brought
by the agency. 267 For example, if Section 307(b) of the CAA provides the U.S.
Court of Appeals exclusive jurisdiction to review the validity of ACOs, then the
Act may be read to provide that ACOs do not become final agency action until
the EPA seeks judicial enforcement of the order.268 Accordingly, one could
reasonably interpret the Act to permit the alleged offender to petition for review
264. See id. at 1249 (discussing the court's method of constitutional interpretation of the
statute) (citing Public Citizen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 465-66 (1989)); see also
INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299-300 (2001) ("[I]f an otherwise acceptable construction of a
statute would raise serious constitutional problems, and where an alternative interpretation of
the statute is 'fairly possible,' we are obligated to construe the statute to avoid such problems.");
Almendarez-Torres v. U.S., 530 U.S. 224,238 (1998) (explaining that the constitutional doubt
doctrine seeks to minimize disagreement between governmental branches by preserving
congressional enactments "that might otherwise founder on constitutional objections").
265. United States v. Stone, 139 F.3d 822, 836 (1 lth Cir. 1998) (quoting DeBartolo Corp.
v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988)).
266. See EPA Petition for Certiorari, supra note 20, at 8 (noting that the court issued its
opinion sua sponte after hearing oral arguments on the merits).
267. See Brief of Respondent EPA, supra note 222, at 19 (explaining the EPA's
interpretation of the CAA review provisions).
268. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 20, at 5-6 (discussing a plausible theory that
avoids the constitutional concerns of the ACO scheme).
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of the validity of the ACO in an appellate court, while obtaining a stay of the
district court's proceedings pending a decision on the petition.
269
Also, the Eleventh Circuit interpreted the scope of the judicial review of
an ACO too narrowly. The court inferred from the language of the statute that
an appellate court may only determine the formal validity of an ACO, that is,
whether the ACO was issued based on "any information available" to the
Administrator. 270 The court, however, failed to consider the context of the
language within the statute, which provides for the issuance of ACOs when "on
the basis of any information available to the Administrator, the Administrator
finds that any person has violated or is in violation of an applicable" provision
of the Act.271 This provision requires the EPA to make a "find[ing]," which
may be reasonably interpreted to mean that the Administrator must make some
sort of determination that there has in fact been a violation of the Act, not
simply the Administrator's bare suspicion that a violation exists.272
Furthermore, the "any information available" standard does not relieve the
agency from the duty of making a reasonable "finding," rather it suggests that
the EPA need not follow formal hearing procedures or apply rules of evidence
in determining whether a violation exists that warrants an AGO.273 Therefore,
when determining the validity of an ACO in a review proceeding, a court
should include the question of whether the conduct giving rise to the ACO did
in fact violate the Act.
274
While the CAA provides for penalties for violation of an ACO,275 nothing
in those provisions suggests that civil penalties would accrue for an order
determined to be substantially invalid.276 In Alaska, the Court offered support
269. Id. at 6.
270. See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Whitman, 336 F.3d 1236, 1252 (11th Cir. 2003)
(discussing the court's view on the limitation of the issues that the courts of appeals may
consider in reviewing an ACO).
271. Clean Air Act § 113(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(1) (2000).
272. See EPA Petition for Certiorari, supra note 20, at 13 (arguing that the CAA
enforcement scheme does not preclude effective judicial review of ACOs).
273. See id. (arguing that the Eleventh Circuit should not have read the provision to require
a court to stop its analysis after the "any information available" standard has been met).
274. Only by inquiring whether the underlying conduct actually violated the Act may a
reviewing court determine if agency action was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.
See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000) (providing the standard of
review of agency action).
275. See Clan Air Act § 113(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b)(2) (2000) (providing for
judicially assessed civil penalties for violation of a requirement of prohibition of any rule, order,
or permit issued under this Act).
276. See EPA Petition for Certiorari, supra note 20, at 14 (noting that an invalid order
should be insufficient to support civil or criminal penalties).
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for this notion in noting that "Cominco would risk civil and criminal penalties
if it defied a valid EPA directive. 2 77 Additionally, the CAA itself specifically
provides that before assessing a civil penalty, the Administrator or the court
"shall take into consideration... such factors as justice may require. 278
Surely, if a court determines that an order is invalid because a party has not
violated an applicable provision of the CAA, justice would require that the
court not impose penalties.279 So long as courts maintain discretion to impose
penalties and inquire into the underlying validity of the order, no constitutional
violation can exist.2 80 Thus, the Supreme Court, the EPA, and common sense
all suggest that a court should not assess penalties for disregarding an ACO
absent a reasonable showing that the subject of the order violated a provision of
the statute in question.
B. Mitigating Due Process Concerns
Even if one were to conclude that pre-enforcement review of ACOs is
never available, it does not necessarily follow that the enforcement scheme is
violative of due process.2 1 In order to offend due process, there would need
to be deprivation of life, liberty, or property without an opportunity to be
heard and present evidence on the question of the ACO's validity.28 2 A
reasonable interpretation of the CAA, however, permits a district court to
hear a challenge to the validity of an ACO in an EPA-initiated enforcement
283action. The Eleventh Circuit's mistaken interpretation of the review
277. Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461,483 (2004).
278. Clean Air Act § 1 13(e)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(e)(1) (2000).
279. See EPA petition for Certiorari, supra note 20, at 14 (arguing that civil penalties
should not be imposed if a party has not actually violated a provision of the CAA); LAw OF
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, supra note 1, § 9:10 (stating that ACOs are valid and enforceable
only when they are supported by valid evidence and not arbitrary and capricious in their
requirements); see also ASARCO, Inc. v. EPA, 616 F.2d 1153, 1162 (9th Cir. 1980)
(invalidating an ACO because its requirements were arbitrary and capricious and not supported.
by the administrative record).
280. See Wagner Seed Co. v. Daggett, 800 F.2d 310,316 (2d Cir. 1986) (concluding that
"it is plain that there is no constitutional violation if the imposition of penalties is subject to
judicial discretion").
281. See, e.g., Laguna Gatuna, Inc. v. Browner, 58 F.3d 564, 566 (10th Cir. 1995)
(rejecting the argument that denial ofpre-enforcement review of an ACO issued pursuant to the
Clean Water Act was a denial of due process).
282. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 433 (1944) (discussing due process
concerns related to judicial review of administrative action).
283. See Brief of Respondent EPA, supra note 222, at 19 (explaining that the EPA
interprets the CAA to allow the subject of an ACO to challenge the validity of the order as a
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provisions of the CAA stem from its insistence that a reviewing court is
limited to inquiring "whether the Administrator possessed any information"
suggesting that the Act had been violated and "any further inquiry into
whether the EPA had 'substantial evidence' of a CAA violation would be
unnecessary and unauthorized." 284 This rationale, however, conflicts with the
APA's default standard28 5 that the Alaska court used to conduct a more
searching inquiry into the propriety of an ACO.286 In Alaska, the Court held
that, in either an EPA-initiated civil action or a challenge to an ACO filed in
state or federal court, the burdens of production and persuasion remain with
the EPA.287 Thus, one should interpret the CAA to permit the defendant to
allege the ACO's invalidity as a defense against liability for noncompliance
with the order and to require the EPA to make a persuasive showing that it
properly issued the ACO based on a reasonable finding of a violation of the
Act. 288 The language of the CAA, its legislative history, and the EPA's own
interpretation of the statute do not indicate that this interpretation would be
inconsistent with the intent of Congress.289
defense in an action brought to enforce the order).
284. See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Whitman, 336 F.3d 1236, 1259-60 n.41 (1 th Cir. 2003)
(explaining the Eleventh Circuit's view of the limitations on review of an ACO).
285. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000) (providing that a
reviewing court may set aside agency action that is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise not in accordance with law").
286. See Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 496 (2004)
(determining that because the CAA does not provide a specific standard ofjudicial review for an
ACO, the Court should apply the Section 706 default standard of the APA).
287. See id. at 494 (noting that the EPA may not retain different standards or burdens of
proof through its choice of litigation forum).
288. See id (holding that in an EPA initiated civil action or a challenge to an EPA stop-
construction order filed in state or federal court, the production and persuasion burdens remain
with the EPA); see also Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
866 (1984) (holding that the EPA's interpretation of a statute that it administers is entitled to
deference).
289. See Clean Air Act § 307 (b)(l), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2000) (providing for review
of final action taken by the Administrator); David Montgomery Moore, Comment, Pre-
enforcement Review ofAdministrative Orders to Abate Environmental Hazards, 9 PACE ENvTL.
L. REV. 675, 697-700 (1992) (discussing the legislative history behind the 1990 Amendments
with respect to pre-enforcement review of administrative orders); see also Yakus v. United
States, 321 U.S. 414, 444 (1944) ("There is no constitutional requirement that [the testing of the
validity of an administrative order] be made in one tribunal rather than in another, so long as
there is an opportunity to be heard and for judicial review which satisfies the demands of due
process. .
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C. Making the ACO Enforcement Scheme Fair and Workable
Categorical allowance of pre-enforcement review for ACOs is
unnecessary and contrary to the structure of the CAA enforcement scheme.29°
Judicial and administrative efficiency would be undermined because regulated
parties would have an incentive to challenge all orders. 29' On the other hand, a
bright-line rule that denies review is out of touch with the reality of the uses
and burdens of this device. 292 Certain ACOs can coerce a regulated party into a
Hobson's choice: Complying with the order may create an enormous financial
burden on a company while the company awaits possible EPA enforcement,
while ignoring the order may subject the party to severe criminal and civil
penalties.293 In such cases, the agency action is clearly "final" in the pragmatic
sense and should be subject to pre-enforcement review.294
Because ACOs apply across a broad swath of statutes and various
programs within those statutes, uniform treatment is impractical if not
impossible. 295 Nevertheless, pre-enforcementjudicial review should be favored
under certain circumstances. Courts should employ the undue hardship prong
of ripeness analysis used in Abbott Laboratories to aid in determining whether
290. See LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, supra note 1, § 9:9 (noting that the
purpose of ACOs is to allow the EPA a quick and responsive enforcement tool for less harmful
violations of the Act). But see Davis, supra note 158, at 223-24 (1994) (arguing that pre-
enforcement review should be granted to ACOs in general).
291. See Laguna Gatuna, Inc. v. Browner, 58 F.3d 564, 566 (10th Cir. 1995) (stating that
"U]udicial review of every unenforced compliance order would undermine the EPA's regulatory
authority"). In Lloyd A. Fry Roofing, the Eighth Circuit raised a legitimate concern with
permitting pre-enforcement review of ACOs by pointing out that such allowance could motivate
the EPA to avoid the pre-enforcement review by side-stepping the order process altogether and
simply filing suit in district court. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. EPA, 554 F.2d 885, 891 (8th
Cir. 1977). Such a scheme could greatly diminish the ACO's utility and the EPA's motivation
to use the orders. See Moore, supra note 289, at 722 (arguing that pre-enforcement review of
ACOs is a needless waste of agency resources and outweighed by the need to abate
environmental damage).
292. See, e.g., Allsteel, Inc. v. EPA, 25 F.3d 312, 316 (6th Cir. 1994) (Wellford, J.,
concurring) (stating that "[Judge Wellford could not] believe that Congress intended that EPA
have the unreviewable authority to close down indefinitely construction of a major plant which
had not yet initiated any emissions without the opportunity for a full-scale hearing to determine
whether the emission system, already approved by the state environmental agency, was in
violation of applicable law and regulations").
293. Id. (Wellford, J., concurring).
294. See id. at 315 (concluding that a stop-construction order that had practical and
immediate consequences on the company was a final agency action).
295. See LAW OF ENvIRoNMENTAL PROTECTION, supra note 1, § 9:10 (noting that the
various contexts that permit issuance of ACOs include abating emergencies, assessing penalties,
gathering information and effectuating in rem remedies such as stop sale orders).
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the agency action was final and thus ripe for pre-enforcement review.
296 This
approach will enable the EPA to maintain the flexibility necessary to effectuate
prompt and efficient enforcement, yet removes the draconian possibilities the
agency can impose on regulated parties by delaying enforcement proceedings
indefinitely.297 Furthermore, this approach to pre-enforcement review should
sift out all but the most urgent claims in which irreparable injury awaits the
regulated party.
D. Applying the Undue Hardship Test
A simple determination of whether agency action is final and thus ripe for
review does not give courts sufficient guidance in the context of ACOs. As
discussed in Part III of this Note, courts have disagreed whether an ACO in a
given situation constitutes final agency action.298 Courts should borrow from
traditional ripeness analysis and consider the "hardship to the parties" in
addition to the finality test when deciding whether an ACO is ripe for pre-
enforcement review.299
Ordinarily, hardship to the parties has been considered along with "fitness"
of the issues in determining ripeness for review. 300 The hardship test asks
whether the challenger would bear substantial hardship through postponement
of judicial review, thereby forcing the regulated party to wait for an agency
enforcement action.301  If the agency action requires an "immediate and
significant change in the plaintiff's conduct of their affairs with serious
penalties attached to noncompliance," courts will recognize a hardship.
30 2
Thus, the agency action must affect the "primary conduct" of the parties in
296. See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 153 (1967) (discussing the extent of the
harm that could befall Abbott if they were denied pre-enforcement review).
297. See Allsteel, 25 F.3d at 316 (Wellford, J., concurring) (discussing the problems
associated with the EPA waiting indefinitely to exercise its enforcement discretion).
298. See supra Part III.D (discussing different finality determinations in the federal courts
of appeals).
299. For a discussion of traditional ripeness analysis, see David Floren, Comment, Pre-
enforcement Ripeness Doctrine: The Fitness of Hardship, 80 OR. L. REV. 1107, 1108-12
(2001) (discussing the fitness and hardship elements of ripeness analysis).
300. See Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 149 (stating that the problem of ripeness "is best seen in
a twofold aspect, requiring [a court] to evaluate both the fitness of the issues for judicial
decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration").
301. See id. at 153 (explaining that when the legal issue is fit for judicial resolution and
significant and unnecessary harm may await the defendant, access to the courts must be
permitted under the APA and the Declaratory Judgment Act).
302. Id.
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conducting their "day-to-day affairs. 30 3 Mere financial harm is not enough,
rather significant changes in business practices and a high risk of exposure to
strong sanctions are necessary to meet the undue burden standard. 304
The inquiry does not end with a discussion of the hardship to the regulated
305party. Courts may also consider the hardship that judicial review would bear
on the agency.306 This question is of paramount importance for the ACO
enforcement scheme because the EPA simply does not have the resources
necessary to defend every decision to issue an ACO in court.307 Therefore, only
by balancing the hardships to both parties can courts decipher which ACOs are
ripe for pre-enforcement review while staying true to the legislative intent
behind granting the EPA a relatively flexible enforcement scheme.30 8
In determining when an ACO may be ripe for immediate review, the
hardship test would give courts added guidance beyond the question of finality.
Some ACOs would clearly satisfy this test, particularly those that order a party
309to cease major construction projects. On the other hand, certain ACOs areless oppressive and merely order a party to comply with a specific provision of
303. See Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158, 164 (1967) (discussing the direct
effects of the regulation on the challenger).
304. See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 153-54 (1967) (discussing the possible
effects of the challenged regulation on challenger's business conduct).
305. See Floren, supra note 299, at 1112 (noting that hardship to an agency faced with pre-
enforcement litigation may be considered under this analysis).
306. See Carter Day Indus., Inc. v. EPA (In re Combustion Equip. Assocs., Inc.), 838 F.2d
35,40 (2d Cir. 1988) (balancing the hardship to the challenger with the hardship to the EPA and
the Superfund statutory scheme in requiring the agency to expend its resources in litigation in
preliminary stages of an investigation).
307. See JOEL A. MiNTz, ENFORCEMENT AT THE EPA: HIGH STAKES AND HARD CHOICES 235
(1995) (noting the paucity of resources the EPA has available for enforcement activity and the
negative impact it has had on EPA's performance).
308. An abundance of scholarship exists which argues that the EPA's current enforcement
scheme is ineffective, inefficient, and needs an overhaul. Indeed, the EPA is regularly testing
new programs and ideas. These arguments and proposals are beyond the scope of this Note.
For further readings on more creative enforcement solutions see generally Richard J. Lazarus,
Meeting the Demands of Integration in the Evolution of Environmental Law: Reforming
Environmental Criminal Law, 83 GEo. L.J. 2407, 2445-59 (1995) (offering suggestions for
effective integration of environmental and criminal law); Clifford Rechtschaffen, Deterrence vs.
Cooperation and the Evolving Theory of Environmental Enforcement, 71 S. CAL. L. REv. 1181,
1220-42 (1998) (advocating the traditional deterrence-based approach to enforcing
environmental laws and suggesting reforms to improve that approach).
309. See Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 244 F.3d 748,750 (9th Cir. 2001)
(finding an EPA cease construction order on a company's power generator burdensome);
Allsteel, Inc. v. EPA, 25 F.3d 312,:314 (6th Cir. 1994) (noting the severe hardship that Allsteel
would undergo if the court denied pre-enforcement review).
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a regulation such as an asbestos removal procedure 310 or to cease dumping
activities in a particular location.31 ' For the sake ofjudicial and administrative
efficiency, courts should treat these types of orders as non-final and leave
regulated parties with the options of either negotiating with the EPA or
challenging the order in a subsequent enforcement action.
3M2
A final potentially thorny problem is a conundrum for the regulated party:
How does one know if the agency action was final until one seeks review? The
EPA and the courts have, for the most part, consistently maintained that ACOs
are not final agency action. 3  Therefore, the simplest solution is for the EPA
and regulated parties to operate from the rebuttable presumption that ACOs are
not final agency action but if an ACO unduly burdens a regulated party, this
presumption is rebuttable by a sufficient showing of hardship.
31 4
Critics of this Note's approach could argue that an undue burden test will
simply shift litigation from one issue to another. Rather than argue whether
agency action was final, regulated parties will begin challenging agency action
as overly burdensome and thus ripe for review. Furthermore, critics could
argue what is needed by the regulated and administrative communities is
certainty, that is, the ability to conduct their affairs in reliance on bright-line
rules of law as opposed to imprecise and ambiguous judicial tests. Such claims,
however, fail to appreciate the practicality of the undue hardship approach.
Because the EPA uses ACOs in a myriad of circumstances under the CAA,
courts have had difficulty in finding a unifying theory. This ripeness test will
benefit courts in navigating the labyrinth of the finality doctrine.
3 5 Although
framed as finality decisions, the existing case law on ACOs already
acknowledges considerations of hardship and is readily applicable going
forward.31 6 Courts should have little trouble discerning a frivolous challenge to
310. See Asbestec Constr. Servs., Inc. v. EPA, 849 F.2d 765, 767 (2d Cir. 1988)
(discussing an EPA order requiring Asbestec to comply with asbestos removal procedures
provided for in Section 112 of the CAA).
311. See Laguna Gatuna, Inc. v. Browner, 58 F.3d 564,565 (10th Cir. 1995) (discussing a
compliance order issued under the authority of the CWA).312. Of course, this approach assumes that penalties may not accrue for invalid orders. See
supra notes 268-78 and accompanying text (arguing that ACOs are invalid if a court later
determines that the challenger did not commit a violation of the underlying Act).
313. See supra notes 245-48 and accompanying text (discussing the agency's reluctance to
concede that an ACO is final agency action).
314. See supra Part V.D (discussing application of an undue hardship test).
315. See JAFFE, supra note 122, at 328-30 (discussing the difficulties associated with
applying the finality test).
316. See Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 244 F.3d 748, 750 (9th Cir. 2001)
(considering the extreme burden that the ACO brought to bear on the company's operations);
Allsteel, Inc. v. EPA, 25 F.3d 312, 315 (6th Cir. 1994) (discussing the hardship that Allsteel
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a routine ACO, yet at the same time will have clear guidance and concrete
examples to aid in determining which compliance orders cross the threshold
and cause undue hardship. Because adding the hardship prong of ripeness
analysis to finality determinations filters out all but the most severe and urgent
pre-enforcement ACO challenges, the courts will have a better idea of the types
of orders that may be oppressive, while the EPA and regulated parties will
likely resolve disputes earlier as a result of more well-defined limitations on the
ACO enforcement scheme.
V1. Conclusion
The Eleventh Circuit declared the ACO enforcement scheme violative of
due process because of a fundamental misinterpretation of the CAA.3 17
Furthermore, the court went out of its way to read constitutional problems into
the statute that a reasonable interpretation would have avoided.318 Thus, the
decision in TVA II should not be followed.
The categorical approaches, either denying or permitting pre-enforcement
review of ACOs, as suggested in the past, are neither prudent nor necessary.319
In the future, courts should use a pragmatic approach in deciding whether to
grant pre-enforcement review of ACOs.320 In addition to the Bennett finality
test, courts should consider the nature of the particular ACO and the hardship it
imposes on both the challenger and the agency.321 In the future, the existing
body of case law on the subject, coupled with a pragmatic method of
determining the ripeness of an ACO for review, should provide courts with
would undergo as a practical and immediate consequence of the ACO).
317. See supra notes 270-97 and accompanying text (describing the Eleventh Circuit's
reading of the judicial review provisions of the Act as too narrow).
318. See supra notes 271-280 and accompanying text (describing an alternative
interpretation of the Act that avoids the due process concerns expressed by the Eleventh
Circuit).
319. See supra notes 290-96 and accompanying text (arguing that either of these
approaches are too extreme to either effectuate the goals of Act or avoid due process concerns).
320. This approach is in accord with the finality guidance that the Supreme Court offered
in FTC v. Standard Oil. See FTC v. Standard Oil, 449 U.S. 232, 239-40 (1980) (noting that
courts have treated finality determinations in a pragmatic and flexible manner consistent with
the facts and circumstances of the case).
321. The Sixth and Ninth Circuits essentially applied this type of analysis without actually
labeling it as an "undue burden test." See Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 244
F.3d 748, 750 (9th Cir. 2001) (concluding that the rights and obligations of the company were
altered by the order at a considerable cost of both time and money); Allsteel, Inc. v. EPA, 25
F.3d 312, 314 (6th Cir. 1994) (noting that compliance with the stop-construction order could
have jeopardized the very survival of Allsteel).
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adequate guidance on the proper treatment of ACOs. 32 2  This approach
reconciles the existing enforcement scheme with the interests of all concerned
parties, namely, the regulated parties, the EPA, the courts and the public.
From a regulated party's perspective, this approach can help avoid an
oppressive Hobson's choice. A party that truly believes it is not in violation of
the CAA will have assurance that if pre-enforcement review of an order is
unavailable, they can challenge the validity of the order in a subsequent
enforcement proceeding.323 The EPA benefits because it may continue to use
one of its most effective and efficient enforcement devices, while ensuring
regulated parties will receive adequate procedural protections.324 This approach
also preserves judicial efficiency because courts will not face a deluge of
challenges to administrative action that would likely result from declaring all
ACOs "final agency action. 3 25 Finally, the public will benefit from quick and
efficient abatement of potentially harmful or toxic acts of pollution. 326 This
comports with the legislative purpose behind granting the EPA the compliance
order authority because it frees up agency resources for pursuing more
egregious violations of the CAA.327 Ideally, a practical system that allows the
EPA to maintain an effective enforcement scheme, while eliminating the need
for regulated parties to make the most painful of Hobson's choices without an
opportunity to challenge the validity of the ACO in court, will produce fairness,
predictability, and efficiency within the Clean Air Act and other environmental
laws.
322. Under the approach suggested in this Note, most of the existing case law would still
be good law. However, TVA II, Solar Turbines, and LloydA. Fry Roofing are inconsistent with
this approach. See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Whitman, 336 F.3d 1236, 1239 (11th Cir. 2003)
(holding that the federal appellate courts lack jurisdiction to review ACOs under the CAA
because of an unconstitutional statutory structure); Solar Turbines, Inc. v. Seif, 879 F.2d 1073,
1081 (3d Cir. 1989) (denying review to a particularly burdensome stop-construction order of a
gas turbine facility); Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. EPA, 554 F.2d 885, 891 (8th Cir. 1977)
(denying pre-enforcement review solely on a theory of implied statutory preclusion).
323. See supra notes 299-320 and accompanying text (discussing a practical interpretation
of the scope ofjudicial review for ACOs).
324. See supra Part II.C (discussing the common uses of ACOs).
325. See Asbestec Constr. Servs., Inc. v. EPA, 849 F.2d 765, 769 (2d Cir. 1988)
(concluding that immediate pre-enforcement review of some ACOs "serve[s] neither efficiency
nor enforcement" of the CAA).
326. See LAW OF ENviRONMENTAL PROTECTION, supra note 1, § 9:9 (discussing the
purposes for which Congress granted the ACO issuing authority).
327. See id. (noting that the ACO is particularly useful in situations involving minor
violations of the Act because the DOJ and the EPA Administrators prefer to use their limited
time and resources in pursuing the most serious violators).
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